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INTRODUCTION  
Credit ratings have a huge impact on the access to and costs of funding, regardless 
whether the rated entity is a private enterprise or a sovereign borrower. Recent market 
disruptions in the sovereign debt markets, e.g. the 19 October 2011 downgrading of 
Spain's sovereign debt, showed again the pivotal role of these agencies and the 
dependence of the financial markets on their judgement. Downgrading of sovereigns, or 
even the announcement of a possible future downgrade may jeopardise the achievements 
of implemented austerity measures at once. Even the establishment of the amended EFSF 
is influenced by rating agencies, which on several occasions hinted, that the rating of 
participating states may depend on the amount of guarantees they provide. 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis there has been a vivid and controversial debate 
about methods, timing and procedures used by these agencies. The market power and the 
obstacles to new rating agencies entering the market have been widely criticised. 
Regardless of the new supervisory powers of the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) on rating agencies this debate continuous.  
The 'Report on credit rating agencies: future perspectives (2010/2302(INI))' adopted in 
March 2011 by the ECON Committee of the European Parliament addresses several topics 
on a macro- and micro-level such as over-reliance, competition in the rating sector, a 
European Credit Rating Foundation and sovereign debt rating. It also asks the Commission 
to assess alternative instruments in order to measure credit risk.  
The proposal of the Commission ('CRAIII') is due by mid-November 2011. 
 What are the positions of the ECB on the influence of rating agencies in the euro 
area? 
 How could over-reliance on external credit ratings be reduced?1  
 What would be the costs and benefits of establishing a European rating foundation?2 
What would be the alternative proposals? 
 Could the ECB or another institution (which might be already in the business of 
judging fiscal sustainability) take the role of an independent provider of sovereign 
credit ratings? 
Five experts from the Monetary Expert Panel elaborated on these questions in more detail. 
                                          
1 See also Paragraph 1-9 in the above mentioned INI Report. 
2 See also the chapter on 'European Credit Rating Foundation' in the above mentioned INI Report (Paragraph 16-
20). 
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ABSTRACTS 
Sylvester C.W. EIJFFINGER - 1. Rating Agencies - Role and Influence of 
their Sovereign Credit Risk Assessment in the Euro Area 
Rating agencies are lagging behind markets in their judgment, as follows from the 
subprime crisis and from analyzing the current sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, their 
business model is flawed as they face major conflicts of interest and are very opaque in 
their methodologies. Also, the oligopolistic structure of the ratings market provides the 
three large Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) with a very strong position, while new entrants 
have the greatest difficulty to enter this market. 
We must reduce the reliance on these bad ratings, by attaching less importance to them in 
prudential regulation and accounting standards. Furthermore, more competition is needed 
to increase the quality of ratings. To facilitate this competition, the interpretation of ratings 
and to improve investors’ own analyses, more transparency is also needed. 
Finally, several policy options to change the ratings industry have been put forward, 
including a network of small agencies, a European Rating Agency, or even the delegation of 
sovereign rating to the ECB. The first option is least preferred, because of the entry costs, 
coordination problems and the lack of economies of scale. The delegation of sovereign 
rating to the ECB would in principle be possible, but not preferable as it leads to a conflict 
of interest within the ECB. That leaves only the option of a European Rating Agency as a 
way to improve rating quality and transparency. However, it also requires high investment 
costs and time for reputation building. 
Guillermo DE LA DEHESA - 2. Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis and Rating 
Agencies 
Ratings are a public good, and should therefore be improved, enhanced and globalized. The 
best solution for the intrinsic problems of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) is a correct 
regulation and supervision. Both should be based on harmonized global standards. In this 
process the US and Europe should take the lead. A level playing field would help to develop 
a larger market and creates incentives for more entrants in the present oligopolistic market 
and could therefore lead ultimately to more competition.  
Anne SIBERT - 3. Ratings Agencies 
In this note the extent of the alleged problems in the credit ratings industry is assessed and 
solutions are suggested. The viewpoint of the ECB is noted and it is considered whether it 
or a new partially publicly funded entity could provide sovereign credit ratings. 
Nicolas VÉRON and Guntram B. WOLFF - 4. Rating Agencies and Sovereign 
Credit Risk Assessment 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have not consistently met the expectations placed on them 
by investors and policymakers. It is difficult, however, to improve the quality of ratings 
through regulatory initiatives. In the short term, changes to the CRAs’s regulatory 
environment, in a context of high market uncertainty, may add to market stress. The role 
of credit ratings in regulation should be reduced but eliminating it entirely would have 
significant downsides, at least in the short term. The transfer of ratings responsibility to 
public authorities, including the European Central Bank, is unlikely to be a good alternative 
because of inherent conflicts of interest. The notion of risk-free sovereign bonds is 
challenged by the crisis, but the most straightforward way to address this challenge in the 
euro area context would be the establishment of a euro-area-wide sovereign bond 
instrument. 
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Karl WHELAN - 5. Ratings Agency Reform: Shooting the Messengers? 
The European Commission has produced a wide-ranging package of proposals aimed at 
reforming the way credit ratings are issued and used. The Commission’s concerns about 
“hard wiring” of credit ratings into the operation of the financial system are well-founded 
but there are limits and pitfalls to the alternatives that they propose. The proposals on 
sovereign debt are largely unobjectionable but the idea that ESMA needs to approve credit 
risk methodologies is worrying in light of the wholly unreasonable criticisms of sovereign 
downgrades from elite European policy makers. Proposals to increase competition via 
issuers rotating their ratings providers are unlikely to do much to improve the quality of 
ratings unless the current issuer-pays model is changed. A more radical reform, involving a 
move towards an investor-pays model, needs to be considered. 
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Abstract 
Rating agencies are lagging behind markets in their judgment, as follows from 
the subprime crisis and from analyzing the current sovereign debt crisis. 
Furthermore, their business model is flawed as they face major conflicts of 
interest and are very opaque in their methodologies. Also, the oligopolistic 
structure of the ratings market provides the three large Credit Rating Agencies 
(CRAs) with a very strong position, while new entrants have the greatest 
difficulty to enter this market. 
We must reduce the reliance on these bad ratings, by attaching less importance 
to them in prudential regulation and accounting standards. Furthermore, more 
competition is needed to increase the quality of ratings. To facilitate this 
competition, the interpretation of ratings and to improve investors’ own 
analyses, more transparency is also needed. 
Finally, several policy options to change the ratings industry have been put 
forward, including a network of small agencies, a European Rating Agency, or 
even the delegation of sovereign rating to the ECB. The first option is least 
preferred, because of the entry costs, coordination problems and the lack of 
economies of scale. The delegation of sovereign rating to the ECB would in 
principle be possible, but not preferable as it leads to a conflict of interest within 
the ECB. That leaves only the option of a European Rating Agency as a way to 
improve rating quality and transparency. However, it also requires high 
investment costs and time for reputation building. 
PE 464.461 9 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 11 
1. LITERATURE 12 
2. COMPARING RATINGS TO SPREADS 15 
3. GOING FURTHER 17 
4. CONCLUSION 19 
REFERENCES 20 
PE 464.461 10 
Rating Agencies - Role and Influence of their Sovereign Credit Risk Assessment in the Euro Area 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
INTRODUCTION 
'Credit ratings have a huge impact on the access to and costs of funding, regardless 
whether the rated entity is a private enterprise or a sovereign borrower. Recent market 
disruptions in the sovereign debt markets, e.g. the 19 October 2011 downgrading of 
Spain's sovereign debt, showed again the pivotal role of credit rating agencies and the 
dependence of the financial markets on their judgment. Downgrading of sovereigns or even 
the announcement of a possible future downgrade may jeopardize the achievements of 
implemented austerity measures at once. Even the establishment of the amended EFSF is 
influenced by rating agencies, which on several occasions hinted, that the rating of 
participating states may depend on the amount of guarantees they provide.  
Since the beginning of the financial crisis there has been a vivid and controversial debate 
about methods, timing and procedures used by these agencies. [Both] the market power of 
the CRAs and the obstacles to new rating agencies entering the market have been widely 
criticized. Regardless of the new supervisory powers of the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) on rating agencies this debate continues.  
The 'Report on credit rating agencies: future perspectives (2010/2302(INI))' adopted in 
March 2011 by the ECON Committee of the European Parliament addresses several topics 
on a macro- and micro-level such as over-reliance, competition in the rating sector, a 
European Credit Rating Foundation and sovereign debt rating. It also asks the Commission 
to assess alternative instruments in order to measure credit risk.1 
 
These developments raise several questions regarding the role of credit rating agencies and 
their regulation in Europe: 
 How have rating agencies behaved and performed in the run-up to the sovereign 
debt crisis? 
 'What are the positions of the ECB on the influence of rating agencies in the euro area? 
 How could over-reliance on external credit ratings be reduced? 
 What would be the costs and benefits of establishing a European rating foundation? 
What would be the alternative proposals? 
 Could the ECB or another institution (which might be already in the business of judging 
fiscal sustainability) take the role of an independent provider of sovereign 
credit ratings?'2 
In what follows, these questions will be answered. First, we will review the recent 
literature, theoretical as well as empirical, to characterize the academic discussion of 
ratings. Then, we will compare the actions of rating agencies to the market opinion. 
Subsequently, we will draw some policy recommendations from the previous sections. 
Finally, the last section concludes.  
                                                     
1 Topic description provided by the European Parliament 
2 Topic description provided by the European Parliament. 
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1. LITERATURE 
After the subprime crisis the literature on credit rating agencies (CRAs) has grown 
tremendously in size. Many authors consider critically the role CRAs have played in the run-
up to this crisis, and find that there are many flaws in the current model of external credit 
assessment and the use of the CRAs’ judgments in accounting and regulation. 
De Haan and Amtenbrink (2011) provide a critical overview of the debate on CRAs, the 
accompanying literature and the proposed regulatory measures at the European level. The 
authors first review the functioning of CRAs, and highlight the most important issues 
regarding the CRA business model. To start with, CRAs have an enormous influence on 
interest rates of bonds, sovereign as well as corporate. This is especially harmful when a 
rating action downgrades a bond to below investment grade, as this may trigger liquidation 
in the form of herd behavior by investors. Furthermore, regulatory requirements rely very 
heavily on credit rating agencies. This excessive reliance on rating agencies has been 
confirmed by, among others, Pagano and Volpin (2010) and White (2010) who states that 
“[e]ssentially, the creditworthiness judgments of these third-party raters had attained the 
force of law.”This overreliance has also contributed to the subprime debacle. Additionally, 
De Haan and Amtenbrink (2011) state that central banks rely on CRA judgment for setting 
collateral requirements on lending. 
Another severe problem with the CRA business model is the “issuer pays” construction, 
which can lead to conflicts of interest (as in the subprime market) and causes issuers to go 
“rating shopping”, thereby selecting the CRA that provides the most favorable rating. 
Although reputational effects should mitigate this behavior by punishing rating agencies 
that provide too generous ratings, this effect has scarcely been observed (Mathis et al, 
2009). This can be explained by another deficiency of the CRA market: the lack of 
competition. This is one of the main points of recent EU regulation (CRAIII), to which we 
will come back later. 
Specific to the sovereign debt market, the CRA model also suffers from shortcomings. One 
is the lack of transparency in rating sovereign bonds. The three big agencies very often 
disagree about the rating of sovereign debt, which may follow from the fact that they all 
use different indicators. Although several empirical studies have tried to identify the 
weights that CRAs attach to the various indicators, this has provided no unambiguous 
results as of yet.3 The main determinants turn out to be GDP per capita, GDP growth, debt 
history, government debt and external debt. However, the weights are not easily inferred, 
so replication of the CRAs’ decision process is not easy. Further complications arise from 
the observations that rating changes concerning one country also affect spreads of other 
countries, CRAs interact in a nonlinear way and that CRAs try to smooth their rating 
changes. The last effect, although the policy is aimed at stabilizing ratings, can lead to so-
called cliff effects: while the rating does not change often, a change is likely to push the 
bond below investment grade, leading to severe liquidation effects. 
We can apply most abovementioned general problems also to the market for structured 
products (another very important domain of rating agencies). A problem that was more 
severe here than for other markets is that of the “issuer pays” model: issuers could 
influence the terms of their rating, and structured their subprime bonds in such a way that 
they just obtained an AAA rating. This so-called rating inflation, together with the 
coarseness of ratings (i.e. the discreteness of the rating categories) and the excessive 
reliance of regulation on these ratings has been an important cause of the subprime crisis4. 
                                                     
3 See also Hill et al (2009) and Alfonso, Gomes and Rother (2011) 
4 See Pagano and Volpin (2010). 
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A problem related to this, and to the smoothing behavior of CRAs, is the sluggishness of 
rating changes: during the subprime crisis, CRAs were very late in recognizing the losses 
from subprime instruments5. In the current sovereign debt crisis we also see this effect, as 
will be documented in the next section. Recent empirical literature has found support for 
this lagging behavior of CRAs. Reinhart (2002) already found that the agencies are 
notoriously bad at predicting currency crisis (which is what the current crisis would have 
been without EMU) although they do predict default very well after a currency crisis has 
occurred. This suggests that rating agencies should also consider other vulnerability 
indicators next to those related to default. More recently, Afonso, Furceri and Gomes 
(2011) have investigated the financial market’s reactions to sovereign rating 
announcements. They find that markets react mainly to negative announcements (for both 
rating actions and outlook communication), and that these communications are not 
anticipated in the 2 months beforehand. This suggests that markets do not incorporate the 
same information in their analyses as CRAs, and that the CRAs’ procedures are not 
transparent. This is confirmed by Gärtner et al (2011), who divide ratings into a systematic 
component, predicted by previously observed procedures, and an arbitrary component that 
cannot be explained. They find that both components affect credit spreads, but the 
arbitrary part becomes much larger during the recent crisis. 
In an attempt to alleviate the problems with credit ratings, the European Commission has 
instated Regulation 1060/2009. De Haan and Amtenbrink (2011) describe the main thrust 
and shortcomings of this regulation. The main idea of the regulation is that there should be 
a legal basis and an enforcement mechanism that can decrease reliance on ratings, 
improve their trustworthiness (through registration and transparency) and simplify the 
supervision of CRAs. However, the certification of rating agencies may actually increase the 
reliance on their judgment, as it creates the impression that their ratings can be trusted. 
Furthermore, increased oversight can lead to the supervisor being responsible for the 
ratings, which goes against the principle of private ratings. These problems will not 
contribute to the increase of due diligence by investors, at least not when capital and other 
requirements still rely on external ratings. 
To conclude this literature section, let us focus a very recent report by 
Intereconomics (2011), which has published a Forum collection of articles on credit rating 
agencies. The main question in this Forum is whether CRAs are part of the solution or part 
of the problem in the sovereign debt crisis. In this collection, several authors take into 
account the most recent state of affairs in Europe, including new regulatory proposals. In 
the first piece of this collection, Günther Tichy argues that CRAs follow the market rather 
than lead it. This caused an overreaction to the sovereign debt crisis, as is also shown in 
the next section. Furthermore, CRAs did not devote enough attention to real problems; 
instead, they focused on financial indicators. The underlying institutional reason is that 
CRAs received too much regulatory power. This holds especially for ECB collateral 
requirements, since these are largely based on ratings by external CRAs instead of the 
central bank’s own assessments. 
Karel Lannoo follows up on this by stating that the EU, like the US, should eliminate the 
regulatory reliance on external credit ratings. Additionally, he argues that the increased 
registration requirements for CRAs restrict entry, and that CRAs should be made more 
accountable by exposing them to civil liability. 
Owain ap Gwilym and Rasha Alsakka analyze whether recent critiques on CRAs have a 
sound basis, by assessing their methodologies and the resulting actions. They conclude that 
the agencies’ practices of providing watch and outlook signals have provided a lot of 
information to the market, as around 90% of the rating actions during the sovereign debt 
crisis has been preceded by such a signal. However, they still agree that governments and 
investors should attach less weight to the CRAs’ judgments and consider a broader range of 
indicators. Moreover, they criticize a few proposed regulatory measures, such as 
                                                     
5 See White (2010). 
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suspension of ratings during financial assistance, the setup of a European CRA and 
increasing the advance warning period for sovereign ratings. 
Donato Masciandaro focuses on the effect that CRAs have on yield volatility, and concludes 
that there may be excessive volatility related to the regulatory and licensing features of 
credit ratings. This has to be evaluated empirically to reach a more solid conclusion. He 
concludes by proposing two ways to get rid of this excessive volatility: disposing of 
regulation that is dependent on ratings, and improving the communication policy of CRAs to 
increase their accountability. 
Finally, Bartholomew Paudyn focuses on the question whether a quasi-public EU CRA is a 
good idea. He concludes that this increases the dependence of regulation and accounting 
standards on external ratings, as it may form an additional entry barrier for new private 
agencies. Together with the ESMA registration requirement this creates more instead of 
less reliance on external ratings, while doing nothing to improve the fallacious analytics of 
ratings and their poor quality. 
Below, we will delve deeper into one aspect highlighted by many authors: CRAs may lag 
behind the market in determining credit ratings. 
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2. COMPARING RATINGS TO SPREADS 
As mentioned above, in the Intereconomics Forum ap Gwilym and Alsakka analyze the 
lagging behavior of CRAs. They are less pessimistic than most authors, as a part of the 
lagging problem is alleviated by outlook and watch statements. They employ a method of 
transforming rating actions, outlook and watch statements into numerical values. Their 
scale consists of 58 points, incorporating the rating, outlook and watch status, as follows: 
Aaa/AAA = 58, Aa1/AA+ = 55, Aa2/AA = 52, … , Caa3/CCC- = 4, Ca/CC, C/SD-D = 1, 
adding “+2” for positive watch, “+1” for positive outlook, “-1” for negative outlook, “-2” for 
negative watch, and “0” for stable outlook and no watch/outlook assignments. The data 
employed are from S&P, Moody’s Investor Service and Fitch Ratings, running from October 
2006 to August 2011. 
To these ratings figures, we add the 10 year government bond spreads for the key players 
in the sovereign debt crisis: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The spreads are 
calculated relative to the German bund, and are denominated in percentages.  
The results of this exercise are plotted in figure 1 below, where the left axis indicates the 
bond spread and the right axis the rating score. A striking observation derived from this 
figure is that the positive attitude of ap Gwilym and Alsakka can hardly be justified, 
particularly when we consider the last 2 years. For most countries, the rating agencies 
lagged very much behind in adjusting their ratings, outlook or watch status. Concerning 
Ireland and Portugal, the agencies were quite up-to-date and also agreed on their rating 
downgrades. For Greece, Spain and especially Italy, however, they were significantly 
lagging behind the market’s increase in yield spread. We can also see that S&P is the 
leading and most pessimistic agency, as it downgrades before the others do, and to a lower 
level. At the end of 2011, however, the ratings of most agencies converge, and even 
overshoot. This is especially severe for Greece and Ireland, who experienced very sharp 
downgrades to excessively low levels. 
Together with the observations from the literature this leads us to the conclusion that CRAs 
are lagging instead of leading, that they are not very objective (they are influenced by the 
market) and that their methodologies are very opaque, as we have only the results of their 
actions to infer from. Furthermore, they are hardly accountable for their actions. The only 
logical conclusion from these observations is indeed that accounting standards, prudential 
regulation and central banks should attribute a much lower value to ratings. Instead, 
market participants and regulators should rely more on their internal models. This, 
however, requires regulation on transparency of rating methodologies and the data used, 
which is exactly what the European Parliament suggests. 
In the next section, we will consider these suggestions and the resulting new regulation 
proposed by the European Commission. 
 
PE 464.461 15 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 1: Ratings versus spreads 
  
   
 
   
 
Source: Bond yields for spread calculations are downloaded from the ECB's Statistical Data Warehouse. 
Note: these figures plot the 10 year government bond yield spread over the German Bund on the left axis in 
percentages, and the ratings of these bonds by the big three rating agencies on the right axis according to the 58-
point scale by Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2011). 
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3. GOING FURTHER 
The European Parliament suggested several reforms to the existing regulation 1060/2009. 
It starts with eliminating the reliance on external ratings and increasing the ability of 
financial market participants to perform due diligence. Additionally, the ECBs decisions on 
collateral requirements should not depend on external ratings any longer. Furthermore, 
barriers to entry for new CRAs have to be removed. The European Parliament wants to 
foster cooperation among smaller CRAs to increase their market power, and wants to 
consider the setting up of a European Credit Rating Foundation. Related to decreasing 
reliance on external ratings, the European Parliament also advocates increasing the 
disclosure of information used for ratings so investors can perform their own analysis. For 
sovereign debt, this is already quite well possible, since the information is publicly 
available. Finally, the governance and accountability of CRAs has to be improved to make 
them more independent and thus able to provide better quality ratings. 
The European Commission (EC) has adopted several of the recommendations, such as 
enhancing disclosure requirements, tightening reporting requirements concerning sovereign 
debt ratings, increasing the liability of CRAs and improving their governance. The EC has 
also indicated, however, that the creation of a European Credit Rating Foundation suffers 
from serious credibility issues; this has also been highlighted by several authors in our 
literature section. Instead, the EC prefers the creation of a network of rating agencies to 
enhance cross-border cooperation and reduce barriers to entry. 
Although this is a significant step in the right direction, there are still several points to 
consider. First, there is still an oligopoly of CRAs who have strong market power, but are 
deeply flawed. An increase in competition should also increase the quality of ratings, but as 
of now there is not much stimulus to competition. On the contrary: the proposed regulation 
concerning registration and compliance creates even more (administrative) barriers to 
entry, as also argued by De Haan and Amtenbrink (2011). Second, these CRAs are not 
liable for their actions, i.e. they are not confronted with the consequences of their ratings 
and outlooks. Both these problems are partially addressed in the proposed regulation. 
Finally, external ratings are still relied upon to a too large extent. This is addressed in the 
proposed regulation by substituting them for internal ratings. However, the validity of 
internal models, and especially their verification by regulators, has been a point of 
heavy discussion. 
What are the alternatives? Several suggestions have been made, such as transforming 
rating into a public service (i.e. by nationalizing CRAs or setting up a European Rating 
Agency), stimulating competition and cooperation between small rating agencies, or even 
delegating the task of providing (sovereign) ratings to the ECB. The first option has been 
proposed by the European Parliament, but has been criticized heavily (e.g. in the 
September/October 2011 Intereconomics Forum issue) for lacking credibility. Especially 
during these times of crisis, a European agency rating European sovereign debt will not be 
taken very seriously by investors. Furthermore, by legitimizing ratings this solution creates 
even more reliance on external ratings instead of internal analyses. However, an 
intermediate solution has been suggested by Welfens (2010), to overcome conflicts of 
interest and credibility issues. In his solution, bond issuers will pay their fees into a fund, 
whose management will then delegate the bond rating to designated agencies. If a 
European Rating Agency is set up in this way it will not issue ratings itself, but will function 
as an intermediary between issuers and raters, hereby sidestepping conflicts of interest and 
credibility issues. 
The second option of stimulating competition seems a viable alternative, but the costs of 
setting up a rating agency, entering the market and building up a credible reputation are 
still very high. These costs are not diminished by the registration and compliance 
requirements suggested by the EC.  
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The last option, delegating the rating of sovereign debt to the ECB, has obvious 
advantages: the ECB has strong expertise in judging fiscal sustainability and is an 
independent body. This means that it can provide a credible assessment of the credit risk of 
sovereign debtors. However, the ECB’s mandate is already quite broad, and has become 
even broader with the setup of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Perhaps an 
intermediate solution, modeled after the same ESRB, can be possible: set up an 
independent rating agency that makes use of the expertise of the ECB. Nevertheless, 
credibility considerations have to be taken into account very carefully also in this case. 
PE 464.461 18 
Rating Agencies - Role and Influence of their Sovereign Credit Risk Assessment in the Euro Area 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. CONCLUSION 
Rating agencies are lagging behind markets in their judgment, as follows from the 
subprime crisis and from analyzing the current sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, their 
business model is flawed as they face major conflicts of interest and are very opaque in 
their methodologies. Also, the oligopolistic structure of the ratings market provides the 
three large CRAs with a very strong position, while new entrants have the greatest difficulty 
to enter this market. 
We must reduce the reliance on these bad ratings, by attaching less importance to them in 
prudential regulation and accounting standards. Furthermore, more competition is needed 
to increase the quality of ratings. To facilitate this competition, the interpretation of ratings 
and to improve investors’ own analyses, more transparency is also needed. 
Finally, several policy options to change the ratings industry have been put forward, 
including a network of small agencies, a European Rating Agency, or even the delegation of 
sovereign rating to the ECB. The first option is least preferred, because of the entry costs, 
coordination problems and the lack of economies of scale. The delegation of sovereign 
rating to the ECB would in principle be possible, but not preferable as it leads to a conflict 
of interest within the ECB. That leaves only the option of a European Rating Agency as a 
way to improve rating quality and transparency. However, it also requires high investment 
costs and time for reputation building. 
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Abstract 
Ratings are a public good, and should therefore be improved, enhanced and 
globalized. The best solution for the intrinsic problems of Credit Rating Agencies 
(CRAs) is a correct regulation and supervision. Both should be based on 
harmonized global standards. In this process the US and Europe should take the 
lead. A level playing field would help to develop a larger market and creates 
incentives for more entrants in the present oligopolistic market and could 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) were created to mitigate problems of asymmetric 
information in debt securities markets between debt sellers or issuers and debt buyers or 
investors. Therefore, they are a public good. When they were being paid by investors they 
did not have a conflict of interest because their incentives were aligned; since 1972, they 
started to be paid by issuers and enter into conflicts of interest. CRAs have several other 
intrinsic problems of market concentration, barriers to entry, liability and others, which 
have been realized by investors and that should be fully addressed by 
regulators and supervisors.  
Their largest conflict has been in the rating of structured financial products and their 
different tranches which were critical in unchaining the financial crisis in 2007-2008. In the 
present sovereign debt crisis their badly timing and sometimes contested sovereign ratings 
have helped to produced cliff effects and contagion. 
Separately, both the US and the EU have increased notably their regulation and supervision 
of CRAs to reduce their intrinsic problems and align properly their incentives. It would be 
extremely important to introduce a level playing field and to achieve global standards to 
achieve a more efficient CRAs system which allows more competition and new entrants to 
reduce its oligopolistic nature. The ECB is fully supportive of the EU efforts to regulate and 
supervise CRAs in order to reduce their conflict of interest, their transparency 
and their efficiency. 
The idea of a totally independent European CRA, but publicly sponsored and financed by 
the European Commission, specialized in sovereign ratings, would most probably fail 
because investors would become suspect about its true independence. Alternatively, a CRA 
sponsored by the ECB would be a non starter because the ECB would be rating its own 
shareholders and because it is beyond its mandate. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have been designed and created to mitigate the large 
problems of asymmetric information existing in debt securities markets between debt 
issuers or sellers and debt investors or buyers, in order to avoid finance directors of private 
companies and/or treasury directors of governments cheating or not providing enough 
information to investors about the solvency of their debt securities issues.  
The main reason why CRAs were created was to allow investors in debt securities to have 
access to a trusted, independent and credible third party opinion, in order to avoid taking 
excessive default risks that they were not able to guess directly, as well as to allow them to 
check if their fund managers were taking excessive risks.  
CRAs business models are based on the fact that they are able to pool very large amounts 
of information about the solvency of debt securities; such information is extremely difficult 
and expensive to be collected by individual investors, and CRAs are able to give a sound 
and independent advice service to the latter at a lower alternative cost. 
CRAs have been given an even stronger and increasing role by regulators under the Basel 
II and Basel III agreements, as well as by the European CRD (Capital Requirements 
Directive), on the basis that they are supposed to produce a “global public good”, given 
that their ratings are public information which can be eventually used freely by investors, 
regulators and the public in general. 
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2. INTRINSIC PROBLEMS WITH CRAS  
There are several intrinsic problems with CRAs that tend both to reduce the efficiency and 
accuracy of their ratings and to produce conflict of interests:  
1 - From their start in the 1930s and until 1972, they were paid by investors, which were 
buying debt securities and taking their risk of default, and, for that reason, they needed an 
independent and trusted third party rating advisor. Therefore, the largest and most 
frequent debt investors were subscribing to their rating services to reduce or minimize 
default risk. This traditional remuneration system was the right one and had the CRAs 
incentives rightly aligned, although it was somehow creating a “free riding” problem, 
because their ratings were made public and could be used by non subscribers as well.  
Nevertheless, after 1972, they started to be paid by the issuers of debt securities, so that, 
they engaged in a serious conflict of interest because they were created for the opposite 
end, that is, to reduce the default risk of debt securities buyers by increasing their 
information about the risks of each debt security and by diminishing the probabilities of 
being cheated by their issuers. 
2 - Until very recently (Dodd-Frank Act 2010), CRAs were not legally liable for their ratings 
in case these were proved to be wrong. Unlike auditors, they have achieved legal 
immunity, when being prosecuted by investors, because they are registered only as 
“financial journalists” which are protected by the 15 December  1791 First Amendment of 
the US Constitution, which established several freedoms, under the Bill of Rights, including, 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Therefore, they exclusively were living on 
their “reputational capital”.  
By contrast, their income was mainly due to having been able to obtain a license given by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US regulator, to become a Nationally 
Recognized Statistically Rating Organization (NRSRO) which gives them a special and 
privileged status to conduct their business, which becomes oligopolistic by nature. 
Therefore, they are an oligopoly blessed by the market regulatory authorities and, at the 
same time, they could not be taken to court if they were wrong in guessing the probability 
of default of their rated debt securities. 
3 - There are very few CRAs because: first, there are large barriers to entry in their 
market, given that it is very difficult to become a NRSRO; second, their network 
externalities are very large and third, the efficiency argument enhances their concentration 
because it is the way to avoid duplicating the large effort by issuers to generate information 
that becomes free of access to others and the public in general (you may consider to make 
clearer this last sentence).  
Some economists believe that there is a de facto duopoly, because the two largest have 
80% of the market and the third one another 18%, and there are another 150 smaller 
CRAs in the world. In that case, it would be better if this duopoly became a monopoly, 
because issuers would not be able to go from one CRA to another pitching for a better 
rating as they do now (Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2009)).  
4 - This latter problem is derived from the conflict of interest of the different users of 
ratings, which tend to have diverging interests. Regulators and debt securities investors 
want a high quality rating in terms of research and analysis, which should be strict, 
independent and unbiased. Debt issuers, by contrast tend always to prefer more 
“favourable” ratings. As they are those which pay the CRAs, the latter become suspect of 
having a clear incentive to tend to be less strict with their ratings in order to get more 
business from the former. 
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5 - CRAs, in order to perform their job, use not only public information, but also private 
information, which is not available to the public, which they obtain from their interviews 
and contacts with the top executives of their issuing clients. This “privileged, non public, 
information” could be used later to sell to the issuers other kind of related advisory services 
(Mariano, 2009) 
6 - Although their price structure is well known and oversee by their regulators, they tend 
to bargain prices with their more regular clients for the following reasons: First, the issuer 
only pays the CRA if its debt security is issued with its given rating. Second, as the CRA 
gives its client a provisional rating, the issuer can have an incentive to turn it down, go to 
another CRA and try to get a higher rating. Third, the issuer can try, before going to 
another CRA, to bargain the rating with the first CRA in exchange of promising it 
more business. 
7 - During the financial crisis, some CRA were suspect to have sold to the issuers consulting 
and advisory services as of how they should structure their CDOs and their respective 
tranches by using complex mathematical models, which could make them more efficient, 
less prone to default and, therefore, able to receive a better rating, which was given 
eventually by themselves. 
8 - Some economists think that, in the case of complex structured products, the amount of 
information given by the issuers to the CRAs and by these to the final investors was very 
low, because issuers thought that it was better for them to give less information to all 
investors than to give more information only to the sophisticated investors, which would 
understand it better. In that way, they were convincing the less sophisticated investors that 
they were not going to lose more than the sophisticated ones or that the latter were not 
going to win more at their expense (Pagano and Volpin, 2009). 
9 - Ratings tend to be pro-cyclical. Their relative changes, that is, their increases minus 
their decreases, tend to show a large pro-cyclicality. Therefore, they cannot be efficient at 
the time of preventing or avoiding large swings in financial markets prices because they 
tend to enlarge them, provoking uncertainty and “herd behaviour” among investors (Amato 
and Furfine, 2003). They also tend to provoke “cliff effects” where a downgrade of a single 
debt security can amplify pro-cyclicality and can cause cascading effects and contagion on 
other securities, as it has been happening during the euro area sovereign debt crisis. 
10 - Ratings tend to be retrospective instead of forward looking. Moody’s did not realize 
that Lehman could default and only reduced its rating four days before it defaulted and S&P 
reduced Lehman rating the same day of its default, creating a huge loss of confidence in 
their ratings, herd behaviour and contagion. Something similar happened to AIG and 
Washington Mutual ratings.  
11 - CRAs only rate debt securities’ probability of default, recovery in case of default and 
correlation of defaults (for investments with multiple assets) but not their market and 
liquidity risks which also affect decisively their risk of solvency and default. They were using 
the same rating methodologies for highly rated debt securities issued by sovereigns, which 
were traded massively everyday in regulated exchanges with a high level of liquidity, as for 
tranches of CDOs which were only sold and bought bilaterally between unknown buyers and 
sellers in illiquid “over the counter” exchanges. 
12 - CRAs ratings methodologies are difficult to understand, given that are based on 
probabilities of default of a debt security and only on its relative probability of default in 
relation to other debt securities of the same or similar issuers, not providing numerical 
estimates of default of each security. 
As a result of these 12 intrinsic issues, CRAs ratings of “structured financial securities” such 
as CDOs and CLOs and their tranches were abnormally high and prone to failure. As a 
consequence, structured securities tranches rated AAA came down from a value of 100, in 
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August 2007 to 23, in December 2008 and those rated AA came down from a value of 100, 
in 2007 to only 4, in 2008, generating a huge lack of confidence by investors on ratings. 
These large failures in the ratings of these structured products, which contributed at the 
peak to more than 40% of the CRAs revenues, proved, once more, some of the intrinsic 
issues and conflicts of interest of CRAs.  
But, even after having realized these large rating failures, simultaneously and surprisingly, 
regulators, under Basel III, were giving CRAs more rating power and more over reliance by 
investors than ever before in history!  
As a reaction to these failures, a round table of financial economists, assembled in 
December 2008, proposed that CRAs should increase the transparency of their models, 
methodologies and practices, that they should be able to be legally prosecuted in case of 
negligent errors and that public authorities should not delegate their regulatory 
responsibility to private companies (Goodhart, 2008) 
Other economists did show a great degree of skepticism about these measures until the 
remuneration incentives issue was not changed. That is, CRAs should come back to be 
remunerated by debt securities investors and not by debt issuers. This serious issue of 
allying remuneration incentives to end results was somehow similar to another previous 
case. This was that of the analysts of investment banks, who recommended investors on 
which shares should they buy or sell, but they had a conflict of interest by being paid by 
the same investment banks. This problem was finally solved when investment banks were 
prohibited to fix their remuneration and when analysts were finally paid according to their 
verified recommendations success (Krawcheck, 2009) 
Finally, other economists have conducted research about the interaction between the 
existing “issuer pays” model of the CRAs and the regulatory use of ratings, such as the use 
of credit ratings to determine bank capital requirements. They found that, in the absence of 
regulation, CRAs publish informative ratings, but rating precision tends to be suboptimal. 
The direction and magnitude of the deviation from the "social optimum" is directly linked to 
the average quality of the issuers, the complexity of the assets to be issued and the 
issuers’ outside options, as potentially represented by other rating agencies and other 
sources of financing. They show that introducing rating contingent regulation that favours 
highly rated securities may mitigate (or amplify) this suboptimal behaviour, but if 
sufficiently large, always leads to regulatory arbitrage, rating inflation and complete 
breakdown of the delegated information acquisition (Opp, Opp and Harris, 2011). 
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3. CRAS NEW REGULATION AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
In the US, there was a pre-crisis Credit Rating Agency reform in 2006, in 2010 the Dodd-
Frank Act was passed and signed into law, followed by further “Studies”. 
In the EU, self-regulation was done before the crisis via an IOSCO (International 
Organizations of Securities Commissions) Code of Conduct. In December 2010 the 
Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 (referred to as CRA1) entered into force. On 11 May 2011, an amendment to the 
previous Regulation on CRAs was adopted, adapting it to the creation of ESMA - European 
Securities and Markets Authority (Regulation (EU) 513/2011, referred to as CRA2).1 
Finally, on 15 November 2011, the European Commission has proposed a Directive and 
Regulation to the European Parliament and the Council (referred to as CRA3) with the 
following four main goals: i) ensuring that financial institutions do not blindly rely only on 
credit ratings for their investments; ii) more transparent and more frequent sovereign debt 
ratings; iii) more diversity and stricter independence of credit rating agencies to eliminate 
conflicts of interest and iv) making CRAs more accountable for the ratings they provide. 
1 - New oversight institutions have been introduced: In the US, an “Office of Credit 
Ratings” has been created within the SEC. In the EU, the 2009 regulation included a 
registration process and a college of supervisors under the CESR (Committee of European 
Securities Regulators) guidance. In the Regulation (EU) 513/2011, the supervision was 
given to a centralized authority: ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority).  
ESMA is an independent EU authority, which will contribute to the stability of the European 
financial system by ensuring integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of 
securities as well as enhancing investors protection. ESMA fosters supervisory convergence 
among securities regulators and across financial sectors by working closely with the other 
European supervisory authorities competent in the field of banking (EBA) and insurance 
and occupational pensions (EIOPA). 
2 - New sanctions have been introduced: In the US the Dodd-Frank Act allows the SEC 
to bar NRSROs, and to suspend and revoke the NRSRO registration for a particular class of 
securities. In the EU, ESMA can withdraw registration of any CRA if it no longer meets the 
conditions or in case of serious or repeated infringement of the regulation. 
3 - Regulation of symbols: In the US, Dodd-Frank Act Section 938 allows different 
symbols for different types of securities and to apply any symbol in a manner that is 
consistent for all types of securities for which the symbol is used. In the EU, Art 10 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 obliges CRAs to use different rating categories for structured 
finance instruments which need to use an additional symbol, which distinguish them for 
rating categories used for any other entities, financial instruments or financial obligations. 
4 - Disclosure requirements: In the US, according to Section 932 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
CRAs should publish annual reports to the SEC and to the public, including internal controls, 
compliance, employment transitions, ratings performance transparency, methodologies  
etc. In the EU, Recital 25 of Regulation (EC) 1060/2009, requires disclosure of 
methodologies, models and key ratings assumptions, but not of sensitive business 
information. Article 12 requires annual transparency reports and Article 11 requires 
information on historical performance collected in a central repository.  
                                                          
1 See also: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/agencies/index_en.htm 
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5 - Conflict of interest: In the US, Section 932 of the Dodd-Frank Act, within the 
governance rules, includes a look-back requirement: CRAs shall i) conduct a review to 
determine whether any conflict of interest of the employee influenced the credit rating and 
ii) take action to review the rating, if appropriate. In the EU, Recital 26 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1060/2009 requires: internal policies to prevent, identify, eliminate or manage and 
disclosed conflict of interest. Recital 22 and Article 6 prohibite ancillary services if this 
activity creates conflict of interest with the issuing of credit ratings. 
6 - Alternatives to the “issuer-pays” business model: In the US, Senator Franken 
introduced an amendment by which a central board would have assigned CRAs to provide 
credit ratings, but the House of Representatives did not accept it in the reform bill. 
According to the Dodd-Frank Act, two studies have to be conducted on this topic: 
i) Government Accountability Office study on alternative business models (Section 939D) 
and ii) SEC study on rulemaking on assigned credit ratings (Section 935F). In the EU, the 
public consultation on CRAs is discussing on alternative business models: i) Investor-pays 
model, ii) Payment-upon results model, iii) Government as hiring agent model, iv) Public 
utility model. 
7 - Reducing over-reliance on CRAs: Over-reliance can be of regulatory or 
behavioral nature. 
i) Regulatory reliance: rating-based regulations such as bank capital requirements in Basel 
II and Basel III, as investment restrictions on certain categories of investors, as well as 
collateral policies of central banks.  
ii) Behavioural reliance: Rating triggers in contracts (rating-based termination provisions 
and internal investment guidelines) as well as rating-dependent “collateral triggers” 
in contracting.  
In the US the Dodd-Frank Act includes in Section 939 (a-f) a removal of statutory reference 
to credit ratings and, according to Section 939A, every federal Agency has 1 year to 
remove regulatory references to credit ratings. The private sector should follow the step to 
avoid behavioural reliance.  
In the EU: in the public consultation on CRAs there was a discussion about over-reliance on 
credit ratings, on the importance of market participants’ own due diligence and internal risk 
management, as well as considering alternatives to credit ratings such as internal models 
and market data. Finally, in July 2011 the Commission proposed a new Directive in the 
context of the so-called CRD IV reducing the number of references to external ratings and 
requiring financial institutions to do their own due diligence. 
8 - Reducing the systemic importance of credit ratings: the FSB principles for 
reducing reliance on credit ratings (October 2010) includes:  
 Financial stability-threatening herding and cliff effects showing that rating 
downgrades can amplify pro-cyclicality and cause systemic disruption; 
 Importance of market participants own due diligence;  
 Ending the mechanistic reliance on credit ratings following several principles:  
i. for regulators: replacing regulatory references to credit ratings by suitable 
standards of creditworthiness;  
ii. for market participants: encouraging market participants to improve their 
risk managements and avoiding the use of rating triggers; 
iii. for central banks: promoting independent evaluations. 
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9 - Liability: In the US, the Dodd-Frank has ended the free speech privilege of CRAs and 
has introduced a liability regime through two dispositions of securities laws. Section 933, 
State of mind and Section 939G, Expert Liability. In the EU, within the Public Consultation 
on CRAs, is addressing Civil Liability. 
10 - Enhancing competition in the rating industry: In the US, the CRA Reform Act of 
2006 introduced competition as a leading objective, but it brought several 
counterproductive effects, namely “rating shopping” and “race to the bottom”. This because 
it is not possible to enhance competition so long as CRAs perform a regulatory function 
more than a private function; therefore it is better to restore market forces prior to 
increasing the number of CRAs. In the EU, within the Public Consultation, there is the 
political idea of promoting the establishment of a European CRA, the proposal of 
introducing new players and of lowering barriers to entry. 
In sum, there are three clear trends in regulation on both sides of the Atlantic: first, more 
regulation and more oversight of CRAs; second, less use of credit ratings and third, find 
alternatives to credit rating models and eventually to the credit ratings themselves. 
The Commission's new proposal on credit rating agencies for a Directive and 
Regulation (CRA3) 
The very recent Directive and Regulation on credit rating agencies proposed by the 
European Commission on 15 November 2011 introduces further advances in the regulation:  
1 - It reduces the number of references to external ratings not only for financial institutions 
(and requires them to do their own due diligence), but it introduces the same rules to fund 
managers to be applied to insurance companies next year. It also introduces a general 
obligation for all investors to do their own assessment. In addition, more and better 
information underlying the ratings would need to be disclosed by CRAs and by the rated 
entities themselves, so that professional investors will be better informed in order to make 
their own judgment. CRAs should communicate their ratings to the ESMA which would 
make sure that all available ratings on debt market instruments are published under the 
European Rating Index (EURIX) making the ratings freely available to investors. Moreover, 
CRAs will have to consult issuers and investors on any intended changes to their rating 
methodologies. Such changes should be communicated to ESMA. 
2 - Member States would be rated more frequently, every six months rather than 12 
months, and investors and Member States would be informed of the underlying facts and 
assumptions on each rating. Sovereign ratings should only be published after the close of 
business and at least one hour before the opening of trading venues in the EU.  
3 - Issuers would have to rotate every three years between the agencies that rate them. In 
addition, two ratings from two different rating agencies would be required for complex 
structured finance instruments and a big shareholder of a credit rating agency should not 
simultaneously be a big shareholder of another rating agency. 
4 - A CRA should be liable in case it infringes, intentionally or with gross negligence, the 
CRA Regulation, thereby causing damage to an investor having relied on the rating that 
followed such infringement. Such investors should bring their civil liability claims before 
national courts. The burden of proof would rest on the CRA. 
In sum, these proposals seem to be going in the right direction in order to address two 
CRAs flaws: i) the near total domination by the big three CRAs and ii) the potential conflict 
of interest between CRAs and the issuers that pay them. At the same time, they try to 
reduce the addiction and reliance of investors and regulators to CRAs ratings and to 
increase and encourage the use of internal ratings. Finally they increase CRAs transparency 
about their methodologies to ESMA. 
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4. CRAS ISSUES DURING THE EURO AREA SOVEREIGN 
DEBT CRISIS 
Leading CRAs have also been accused of exacerbating the Greek debt crisis by 
downgrading Greek bonds just as European officials were about to unveil a support plan, as 
well as of downgrading Portuguese bonds provoking cliff cascading effects. 
It is true that there has been an interaction between ratings, short positions in the market 
and increasing use of the CDS market for default protection. There has also been a clear 
self-fulfilling interaction between rating downgrading and investors herd behaviour. But this 
tendency to herd behaviour is mainly a consequence of the huge uncertainty created 
among investors by European leaders every time they meet. The management of this crisis 
will become a major lesson of business schools and schools of government at universities 
as how not to manage a crisis. 
Investors, when facing increasing uncertainty, tend to achieve a situation of “bounded 
rationality” and this more limited rationality makes them to lose confidence and to herd. 
The problem is that when investors herd, they reach quickly “multiple equilibria” which tend 
to be extreme. Since the start of the euro area, investors have shown extreme confidence 
on the monetary union and spreads of most Member States over the bunds benchmark 
were ridiculously low.  
For instance, Spain’s sovereign debt maintained for a long time a spread of 3 basis points 
versus that of Germany, which was clearly an investor’s mistake of overconfidence on 
Spain. When the crisis started with Greece in October 2009, investors lost confidence on 
how the debt crisis was being managed, not only for not letting the IMF resolve the Greek 
crisis and later reschedule its debt, but for not taking a rational action to avoid contagion.  
At the time of writing this briefing paper, in the middle of the growing euro area sovereign 
debt crisis, France, which is AAA, has a CDS that is the double of that of Chile, which is A+, 
and higher than those of Mexico and Brazil, which are BBB. Spain, which is AA-, has a CDS 
which is almost three times higher than that of Chile and two times higher than of those of 
Mexico and Brazil. 
Apparently, this does not make any sense. Either investors who ask for protection in the 
CDS market do not pay any attention to ratings, or they are useless for them. These 
discrepancies may be due to different causes. First, to the fact that ratings are long term 
and CDS spreads are at very short term. Second, CDS spreads are a real market price 
which changes continuously while ratings are an opinion that changes once or twice a year. 
Third, ratings only assess the probability of default and CDS also take into account liquidity 
and depth in the market. 
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5. THE ECB VIEWS ON CRAS REGULATION 
Price stability and financial stability are the two main objectives of the ECB. Therefore the 
ECB must be very worried about the important effects that the perceived existence of 
shortcomings in the rating activity performed by CRAs may have on market confidence and 
their possible adverse effects on financial stability. Even more, when medium term price 
expectations are below target and, by contrast, increasing sovereign debt problems, herd 
behaviour and contagion, are affecting very seriously the financial stability of the European 
banks and other financial institutions, which, in turn, are affecting the monetary 
transmission mechanism of the ECB’s monetary policy, which is essential to meet its price 
stability objectives.  
The ECB presented its views on the regulation of rating agencies on several occasions: 
 ECB opinion CON/2009/38 of 21 April 20092 on the 2008 Commission proposal for a 
regulation on credit rating agencies 
 ECB opinion CON/2010/82 of 19 November 20103 on a proposal for a regulation 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies 
 In due time, it will most probably provide its views on the recent proposed Directive 
and Regulation of the EU Commission of 15 November 2011.  
In February 20114 the Eurosystem responded to the 5 November 2010 Commission 
consultation paper on credit rating agencies. 
Its views are the following: 
1 - The Eurosystem supports the Commission’s efforts to reduce the reliance of financial 
markets and the official sector on CRAs ratings and to diminish the impact of “cliff effects” 
on financial institutions and markets. The ECB response says that the crisis has shown that 
the over-reliance on ratings, as they are embedded in many regulations and private 
contracts through rating downgrades (and their spillover effects) can destabilize financial 
markets. In that sense, the Eurosystem agrees with the Commission’s approach consisting 
of two main pillars: first, requiring financial firms to undertake their own due diligence and 
internal credit risk assessment and second, reducing the reliance of regulation and 
supervisory practices on external ratings. 
The Eurosystem presents a comprehensive stock-taking exercise of situations where CRAs 
ratings area embedded in regulations and private contracts, including the use of ratings in 
the collateralization requirements of OTC derivatives transactions. The crisis has shown that 
for the survival of firms and to preserve the broader financial stability, financial firms have 
to make their own credit assessment and due diligence of every transaction they 
contemplate entering should apply, following the principles of the FSB for reducing reliance 
on CRA ratings published in October 2010, which states: “Banks, market participants and 
institutional investors should be expected to make their own assessments and not rely 
solely or mechanistically on CRA ratings”. This, in turn should ensure that financial firms 
should not invest or trade any product that they do not adequately understand or of which 
they cannot fully assess the risks. 
The Eurosystem recognizes that, as shown during the crisis, inadequate expertise and 
excessive reliance on third party assessments are causes of mispricing, panic, sharp sell-
offs and contagion. 
                                                          
2 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/c_11520090520en00010014.pdf 
3 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/c_33720101214en00010009.pdf 
4 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ecpublicconsultationcreditratingagencieseurosystemreplyen.pdf 
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2 - The Eurosystem warns that vigilance is required regarding measures that would replace 
one credit risk measure (external rating) by a single alternative measure (single market 
measure). Hardwiring and automatic reliance on a single credit measure or single third 
party within regulatory/supervisory and market practices assessment should be avoided. As 
shown during the crisis these practices lead to forced selling, cliff-effects, severe downward 
spirals and contagion. 
3 - The Eurosystem is cautious against any automatic reliance of regulation on market 
based variables. Market-based information may be excessively volatile and significantly 
misleading during times of market dislocation. In these situations, market information can 
be pro-cyclical resulting in mispricing over longer time periods. 
4 - As regards sovereign risk ratings, the Eurosystem believes that internal capabilities to 
assess sovereign risk should be developed in the general investment framework and credit 
risk assessment of a financial firm, which should also include the distribution of exposures 
across several countries. 
5 - Internal risk assessments may not be as broad as the ratings analysis from the CRAs 
and one should keep in mind that some investors and institutions may not have the 
economies of scale to do their own credit assessments.  
6 - The Eurosystem suggests making a distinction between financial institutions’ internal 
assessment and due diligence on the one hand and methods to calculate the required 
capital requirements on the other hand. Standardized approaches can be used to calculate 
capital requirements by smaller/less sophisticated firms, while still requiring that these 
firms develop adequate risk assessments and due diligence capabilities commensurate with 
their activities. 
7 - The Eurosystem supports initiatives to enhance transparency and disclosure of the 
methodology and rating process in relation to sovereign debt. In addition, the 
harmonization of key definitions, such as sovereign default, would be welcomed as it would 
add clarity on the meaning of ratings by different CRAs. 
8 - The Eurosystem agrees that sovereign ratings issued in a timely manner and accurately 
reflecting all of the available information would in turn contribute to reducing volatility of 
ratings themselves. However, some substantial issues related to the CRAs methodology for 
sovereign ratings would need further clarification. It is not clear how major facilities 
established to address the recent crisis, EFSM and EFSF, are evaluated by the rating of the 
countries concerned. Moreover, sovereign ratings should be reviewed more frequently and 
regularly at times of crisis. If, for example, CRAs issue regular reports (e.g. weekly) on 
their monitoring of sovereign under stress, the information shock of a downgrade could be 
better priced by the markets and multi-notch downgrades would not be necessary. 
9 - CRAs should inform country’s authorities ahead of the publication of a sovereign rating 
both for solicited and unsolicited ratings or reviews. Additionally, CRAs should explicitly 
indicate if a sovereign or supranational rating is unsolicited and the communication of the 
rating issuance should indicate in detail how the rating methodology departed from the one 
used for solicited ratings. Often, sovereign ratings do in fact influence markets, although 
more via credit warnings (outlooks, reviews, and watches) than actual rating changes.  
10 - The Eurosystem fully supports measures aimed at increasing the disclosure, 
transparency and clarity of methodologies, models and assumptions parameters 
surrounding the approaches adopted by each CRA. Quantitative measures are only one part 
of the input into sovereign rating decisions. CRAs fail to publicly disclose details on the 
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precise functions and econometric models employed. Given the relatively small number of 
sovereign defaults, the methodology used by CRAs may not offer a reliable and consistent 
measure of the sovereign specific credit-worthiness. There is no harmonized definition of 
sovereign default among CRAs which is reflected also in the calculation of corresponding 
probabilities of default, so that a better standardization of definitions would help investors 
to understand ratings themselves and take actions, especially in times of crisis. 
11 - The Eurosystem recognizes the issues related to the oligopolistic structure of global 
credit rating market dominated by a few CRAs and supports the importance of addressing 
the issue. There are different ways of addressing this problem. One is enhancing 
competition by facilitating market entry, by increasing transparency of credit ratings as 
regards data used, methodology and assumptions made by their models (USA). In this 
context, requiring firms to use at least two external ratings issued by different CRAs and to 
consider the exposure as unrated, unless at least two external ratings exist, would be 
easier to implement with a larger offer of external ratings than today. The Eurosystem 
would support provisions requiring hired CRAs to make accessible the data they received to 
non hired CRAs, when rating structured finance products and other instruments like 
corporate bonds. 
12 - The ECB should not issue public ratings to be used for regulatory purposes. 
Notwithstanding, the Eurosystem fully supports the efforts to reduce the reliance of 
financial markets and the official sector on CRAs ratings and to diminish the impact of “cliff 
effects” of the regulatory use on financial institutions and markets. In this context the ECB 
itself started a process to enhance and develop further its internal capabilities for 
independently assessing the creditworthiness of issuers and issues eligible for credit 
operations and for critically reviewing external assessments. Every year, the ECB reviews 
the functioning of the Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework (ECAF) and allows the 
recognition, internally to the Eurosystem, of the four in-house credit rating assessments 
from four EU National Central Banks (France, Germany, Spain and Austria) (please check 
this lqst sentence). 
13 - The Eurosystem believes that the idea of a European Network of small and medium-
sized CRAs will help build up expert knowledge and improve methodologies, capable human 
resources, and data exchanges, development of common IT systems, internal controls and 
extra capacity that may improve the quality of ratings. Such a network could provide some 
support in the early stages of a CRA business being set up,  each of the CRAS being 
specialized in different areas. The new CRA regulation also needs to avoid potential exit of 
some small and medium size CRAs. 
14 - A high standard of civil liability for CRAs has been introduced in the US law and a 
similar standard should be further studied for the EU, making CRAs liable for the 
performance of ratings when they have failed to conduct reasonable investigation into the 
facts used by its methodology or verify them if obtained from other parties. 
15 - The Eurosystem agrees that the current “issuer-pays” financing model of ratings can 
be a source of conflict of interest and thus may have a distorting influence on ratings. 
However, not just the type of payment model can lead to conflict of interest: the lack of 
transparency regarding payment models and modalities can also lead to less than ideal 
outcomes. The “subscriber-investor pays model” could be the alternative, but some US 
evidence shows that newly founded rating agencies are more likely to use the “subscriber-
pays model” than the “issuer-pays model”, whereas the bigger CRAs use the “issuer-pays 
model”. However, it is unclear if this is due to timing or perhaps related to the smaller size 
and higher specialization of the smaller firms. Other models can also involve conflict of 
interest and bring distortions to the markets, albeit of a different kind.  
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6. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A EUROPEAN RATING 
FOUNDATION 
It is understandable to blame CRAs for having rated CDOs making type 1 errors, (a 
hypothesis such as an structured product is risky is rejected when it should have been 
accepted) and type 2 errors (a risky structured financial product is accepted when it should 
have been rejected) and having repeated the same two types of errors when rating 
European sovereign debt, when compared to similar ratings of the US and the UK sovereign 
debt (De Grauwe, 2009). It is correct to say that CRAs should have been liable for their 
ratings on structured mortgage financial products that unchained the financial crisis, 
however they cannot be blamed for having created the European sovereign debt crisis, but 
for having exacerbated it with badly timed downgrades, which have produced “cliff effects” 
and contagion.  
The European sovereign debt crisis was announced since the beginning of the 1990s by 
many economists including myself ( de la Dehesa and Krugman, 1992) because the EMU 
had from the start several design failures and later by basic crisis management failures. It 
has been made much worse by an incredibly slow and bad management by our European 
leaders that still carries on at the time of writing this briefing paper after two years, since 
the breakup of the Greek crisis.  
Therefore, the crisis is basically the result of a combination of design and management 
failures. At the beginning of the euro area, investors trusted fully the EMU, but later 
realized that the euro area was not an optimal currency area, did not have a lender of last 
resort in the ECB and did not have a common fiscal policy or, at least, a very large 
community fund to face asymmetric shocks in Member States. After these discoveries, 
investors found out that European political leaders were not prepared to fix these 
design failures.  
The non-legislative resolution of the European Parliament, in June 2011, included asking 
the European Commission to study the potential creation of a new totally independent 
European Credit Rating Foundation (ECRaF). In principle, given the oligopolistic structure of 
the supply market for ratings, any new entrant should be welcomed. Nevertheless, it would 
be a novelty in the market of CRAs, given that, until now, CRAs have been created by the 
private sector and not promoted by a public body and even more so by a 
European public institution.  
This new ECRaF should not be publicly sponsored even if the Commission would only put 
seed capital and development capital until the ECRaF would raise enough private capital, 
because it would not be considered independent and trusted by investors, even more when 
it would specialize on sovereign ratings. I cannot imagine the European Commission acting 
as a venture capitalist of the Foundation. 
Investors would not take seriously its sovereign ratings because they would find them 
biased by political interference if the Commission would promote it. The ECRaF should be 
promoted by groups or associations of independent European investors to have a fourth 
view on ratings, besides those of the top three oligopolistic CRAs. Being European would be 
better than being from a defined nationality, given that today sovereign 
debt securities are national. 
Nevertheless, when most of the European issuance would become Eurobonds, if the ECRaF 
would be public the general suspicion about its lack of independence would be so large that 
it would fail to attract any investor attention. Therefore, it should be left to private 
investors, if they see an increasing development of the market for ratings, as it seems to 
be the trend today, to create new CRAs entrants to compete with the present top three 
CRAs. They would be much more credible than a publicly sponsored CRA. 
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Could the ECB be an independent provider of European sovereign credit ratings? 
The ECB is in charge of the euro area monetary policy which should be able to achieve price 
and financial stability and that is already a difficult mandate and a huge task. Even if in the 
Lisbon Treaty its independence to take decisions is absolute, it should never be engaged in 
rating its own shareholders which are all the euro area Member States plus the rest of the 
EU Member States. It would not only be an oxymoron but also a dangerous decision with 
no support in the Treaties, which would not be approved by its Council because the ECB 
would lose independence and credibility. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
As I mentioned at the beginning, ratings are a public global good, so that they should be 
improved, enhanced and globalized. Therefore, the best solution for the intrinsic problems 
of CRAs is a correct regulation and supervision, but both should be based on both 
harmonized and global standards. The US and Europe should take the lead and harmonize 
their standards, even if they not became identical. A level playing field would help the 
development of a larger market and also create incentives for more entrants to compete in 
the present oligopolistic market. 
IOSCO could be the forum where to try to harmonize these standards but also a new global 
authority could be created, to which individual jurisdictions would delegate their supervision 
of CRAs (Véron, 2011) 
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In this note the extent of the alleged problems in the credit ratings industry is 
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sovereign credit ratings. 
 
PE 464.461 39 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
CONTENTS 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 41 
1. INTRODUCTION 42 
2. SOME BACKGROUND ON RATINGS AGENCIES 43 
Changed the Industry 
3. 
4. 
51 
4.3 What Does the E
REF
2.1 The Early Years 43 
2.2 Two Things that 44 
PROBLEMS AND FEATURES OF THE CREDIT RATINGS INDUSTRY 45 
3.1 Do Ratings agencies Provide Useful Information? 45 
3.2 Is the Credit Ratings industry’s Oligopoly Structure Good or Bad? 45 
3.3 Conflicts of Interest 46 
3.4 Do Ratings Agencies Extort Their Clients? 47 
3.5 The Role of Credit Ratings agencies in the Financial Crisis 48 
3.6 Are Investors Overly Reliant on Ratings? Is the Market? 49 
HOW CAN THE CREDIT RATINGS INDUSTRY BE IMPROVED? 51 
4.1 Getting Rid of Conflicts of Interest, Egregious Bad Behaviour and the Credit-
Ratings industry’s Involvement in Creating Structured Investment Products 51 
4.2 Solving the Problem of the Over Reliance on Ratings 
CB Think? 52 
4.4 Should the ECB take the role of an independent provider of sovereign risk ratings?  
Should a new independent European Credit Ratings agency? 53 
ERENCES 54 
 
PE 464.461 40 
Ratings Agencies 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 Until the early 1970s ratings provided little information to the market. Issuers were 
rated for free and raters sold books of ratings. This was not especially profitable. 
The ratings industry escaped regulation, probably because of its lack of importance.  
 Two things changed the industry. Illiquid markets after the bankruptcy of the Penn 
Central Railroad in 1970 caused debt issuers to actively seek out ratings and ratings 
agencies began to charge issuers. Laws and regulations were made dependent upon 
the ratings of a small number of firms, making these ratings enormously important.  
 Although the ratings agencies have been condemned for a number of recent errors in 
judgement, some studies show that rating changes do have informational value. 
 The ratings industry is an oligopoly. However, some industries with few firms remain 
highly competitive. If the industry had a large number of small firms, each with its 
own metrics and standards, it might cause confusion for the users.  
 The ratings industry faces conflicts of interest. Agencies are paid by issuers and the 
fee is a proportion of the issue’s value. Ratings agencies sell consulting services as 
well as ratings. Their management may sit on the boards of the firms that they rate. 
Firms rate the sovereign debt of countries that regulate them. US-based firms 
dominate the industry.  
 Following the past decade’s financial boom and bust, credit ratings agencies have not 
only been charged as incompetent, but have been accused of behaviour that is overtly 
criminal. In particular it has been alleged that they extort firms that do not pay for 
ratings by giving them unsolicited ratings that are lower than they deserve.  
 It is argued that banks, with the help of the ratings agencies, turned bundles of junk 
bonds into AAA tranches of CDOs, helping to fuel the growth of this dysfunctional 
market and thereby playing an important role in propagating the financial crisis. 
 Ratings alone are a poor measure of risk, but the financial sector may have a culture 
of being overly dependent on them. The excessive importance placed on ratings could 
cause a rating change to make a fear or ebullience-driven market outcome possible. 
There is little evidence that this has happened in the current sovereign debt crisis. 
 Credit rating firms should be registered but the NRSRO (Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organisation) designation should be eliminated. Registered firms 
should only be allowed to rate; they should not be allowed to provide other services 
or products. A rating agency should not be allowed to offer unsolicited ratings if it also 
offers ratings paid for by issuers. Senior managers should not sit on the boards of the 
firms they rate. Issuers should have to rotate raters. 
 To help solve the problem of over reliance on ratings, to the extent possible regulation 
should depend on market-based measures instead of ratings. However, there needs 
to be flexibility in the case of market dysfunction. 
 The ECB supports solutions that reduce over reliance on ratings and it wants more 
transparency with respect to sovereign debt ratings. Sensibly, it does not want to issue 
such ratings itself. Setting up a partially publically funded European rating foundation 
would be difficult and expensive and could not be done quickly and might also raise the 
barriers to entry in the industry, decreasing competition rather than increasing it. It would 
have a clear conflict of interest when rating sovereign issues or the issues of European 
agencies such as the EIB, the EFSF, the EFSM and the future ESM.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The three big firms that dominate the credit rating industry have recently been viewed as 
incompetent, badly behaved and bumbling. They have been condemned for failing to 
downgrade mortgage-backed securities quickly enough and for not foreseeing the failures 
of Lehman Brothers and AIG. Their participation in the CDO market is seen as an important 
factor in worsening the financial crisis. They have been called extortionists who give 
unsolicited bad ratings to firms that do not employ them. Earlier this month Standard & 
Poor's accidentally released an erroneous message saying that it was about to downgrade 
French sovereign debt. In this note I provide a brief historical background of the credit 
rating industry and describe the two important changes that gave the industry its current 
business model and importance. I assess the extent of the alleged problems with the 
industry and suggest solutions. I note the viewpoint of the ECB and consider whether it or a 
new partially publicly funded entity could provide sovereign credit ratings. 
PE 464.461 42 
Ratings Agencies 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
2. SOME BACKGROUND ON RATINGS AGENCIES 
In this section I describe how the credit ratings industry came to be and the two changes 
2.1 The Early Years 
 ratings agencies were the mercantile credit agencies that 
agencies go back to 1860 when Henry Varnum 
 
 
ugh the early 1970s the ratings agencies constituted a rather 
ratings agencies followed the business model of rating companies for 
                                                
that gave it its current shape.1 
The ancestors of the modern
rated merchants’ abilities to repay their loans. These began following the Panic of 1837 
when Louis Tappan left the silk trading firm that he ran with his brother and established the 
Mercantile Agency in New York in 1841. It operated by collecting information through a 
network of agents, including attorneys, bank cashiers, merchants and others and then 
selling this information to subscribers. In 1859 the agency was acquired by Robert Dun who 
changed its name to R.G. Dun & Company and published the Dun Book, its first reference 
book of credit information. A similar agency was formed by John Bradstreet in 1849 and it 
published a ratings book in 1857. In 1933 the two firms consolidated into 
Dun & Bradstreets.  
The origins of the current big three ratings 
Poor published a comprehensive compilation of information about the fiscal state of US 
railroads. Together with his son Henry William he founded H.V. and H.W. Poor Co. which 
published annual updates of his compilation. In 1906 Luther Lee Blake founded the 
Standard Statistics Bureau with a view to providing similar information on non-railroad 
companies. The two firms merged to become Standard & Poor’s Corporation in 1941.  
Meanwhile, in 1900 John Moody & Company published Moody’s Manual of Industrial and
Miscellaneous Securities, providing information and data on the stocks and bonds of private 
firms and government agencies. The manual was a great success, but unfortunately it met 
its demise in the stock market crash of 1907. In 1909 John Moody rebounded with the idea 
of rating US railroad bonds and he extended this idea to utility and industrial bonds in 
1913. By 1924 his service covered almost all of the US bond market.  
The last of the current big three agencies to arise was Fitch. In 1913 John Knowles Fitch
founded the Fitch Publishing Company. In 1924 it introduced its familiar AAA through D 
rating system. 
From the 1950s thro
uninteresting industry. It appears that their ratings provided little information to the 
market. According to a study of 207 corporate bond rating changes from 1950 to 1972, 
credit rating changes generated information of little or no value. Instead they merely 
reflected information that had already been incorporated into market prices.2 This was 
hardly surprising as most of the information that the ratings agencies used was 
publicly available.  
Up until the 1970s the 
free and then publishing thick volumes detailing their results. These volumes were sold to 
investors. However this information could be easily copied and the ratings business was not 
a terribly profitable one. The ratings industry escaped regulation, probably because it was 
thought to be insufficiently important to bother with. 
 
 
1 Histories of the credit ratings industry can be found in Cantor and Packer (1994) and Partnoy (2009). 
2 See Pinches and Singleton (1978). 
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2.2 Two Things that Changed the Industry 
Two things happened to change the fortunes of the ratings agencies and to turn them into 
the companies that they are today. The first was the bankruptcy of the Penn Central 
Railroad in 1970. At the time it was the largest corporate bankruptcy in US history and 
financial markets were stunned. Driven by fear, investors questioned the condition of other 
companies and refused to roll over their commercial paper. Faced with illiquid markets, 
issuers of debt began to actively seek out ratings. As a result both Moody’s and Fitch began 
to charge issuers of debt in 1970 and Standard & Poor’s did the same a few years later. 
Under the new business model, issuers of debt provided substantial amounts of detailed 
private information to the ratings agencies. The agencies used this information as well as 
publicly available information to come up with a rating. The issuer then paid the ratings 
agency a fee that was proportional to the value of the issue. This new system had the 
potential to greatly increase the information content of the ratings, but as will be seen it 
also led to conflicts of interest, promoted the development of the collateralised debt 
obligation (CDO) markets which helped fuel the financial crisis and possibly led to 
significant explicit and implicit extortion. 
The second thing that happened to change the ratings industry was when legislators and 
regulators made laws and regulations depend upon ratings. The origins of this go back as 
far as the 1930s. In 1931 the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ruled that banks 
had to mark to market bonds that had not been rated above speculative grade by at least 
one recognised ratings agency and in 1936 it prohibited them from holding such securities 
altogether. By recognised agencies it meant Moody’s, Poor’s, Standard Statistics Bureau 
and Fitch. When regulators made rules that depended upon a small number of company’s 
ratings, they made these ratings enormously important.  
In 1975, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) formulated risk-weighted 
capital adequacy requirements for banks and broker-dealers that depended on the safety of 
the assets held by these financial firms. To clarify these rules, the SEC decided to use 
bond’s credit ratings as the measures of their risk. It then designated Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch as the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organisations (NRSROs) 
whose ratings would be used to assess whether the financial firms were satisfying the 
regulatory requirements. Currently bank capital requirements depend on ratings and so do 
the requirements of other private institutions. Many pension, insurance and money market 
funds have constraints based on credit ratings. 
Partnoy (2001) describes the valuable property rights that come with NRSRO membership 
as regulatory licenses. Agencies have come and gone from the NRSRO list and there are 
currently nine, but the big three still account for the lion’s share of the market.  
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3. PROBLEMS AND FEATURES OF THE CREDIT RATINGS 
INDUSTRY 
In this section I consider some of the problems and features associated with the industry.  
3.1 Do Ratings agencies Provide Useful Information? 
s in judgement. 
ngs 
Cantor and Packer (1996) shows that to a great extent Moody’s and 
tings do provide information to the market. 
 d 
The big three ratings agencies currently account for roughly 95 percent of the industry 
firms remain 
The ratings agencies have been condemned for a number of recent error
This raises the question: do ratings agencies provide useful information to markets? 
In contrast to Pinches and Singleton’s (1978) study of the earlier years of the rati
agencies, some studies of more recent years do show that rating changes have some 
informational value. Hand et al (1992) show that both stock and bond prices react to 
ratings changes. Empirical studies of the informational value of rating changes are made 
difficult because a change in a rating is usually triggered by some event and it is difficult to 
disentangle the effect of the change in the rating on a bond price from the effect of the 
event on the bond price. Kilger and Sarig (2000) cleverly sidestep this problem by looking 
at the impact of Moody’s 1982 refinement of its rating scheme. They found that it did not 
change the total market value of borrowers but it did alter the share of debt 
and equity values. 
An empirical study by 
Standard & Poor’s sovereign ratings assessments are explained by just a small set of 
variables: per capita GDP, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, the level of economic 
development and past default history. Moreover, the market’s assessment of the relative 
risk of sovereign default, as measured by sovereign debt yields, is broadly similar to that of 
the agencies. However, rating announcements have immediate effect on market pricing, 
especially for sub-investment grade issues. 
To summarise, it appears that changes in ra
However, some caution must be used in interpreting the above results. Ratings changes 
may change bond prices. Some of the change may happen because the market learns 
something about the creditworthiness of the issuer that it did not know before. However, 
some of it could be due to the regulations, institutional rules and the culture of the financial 
sector which could cause bond prices to depend on ratings through other channels than the 
information that they convey about the creditworthiness of the issuer. 
3.2 Is the Credit Ratings industry’s Oligopoly Structure Goo
or Bad? 
market share, with Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s each accounting for about 40 percent 
and Fitch for about 15 percent. The small number of large firms is not surprising as the 
required reputational capital alone would serve as a significant barrier to entry by other 
firms. This problem has been exacerbated by the importance of ratings in legislation and 
regulation and the SEC granting NRSRO status to a small number of firms. 
The oligopoly structure is not necessarily a problem. Some industries with few 
highly competitive as can be seen from the UK supermarket industry, the US market for 
cola or the global civilian aircraft manufacturing industry. Little anti-competitive behaviour 
seems evident in the credit ratings agency industry. Moreover, if the industry had a large 
number of small firms, each with their own metrics and standards, rather than the big 
three it might cause confusion for the users.  
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3.3 Conflicts of Interest 
The ratings industry faces a number of potential conflicts of interest. First, the agencies are 
paid by the issuer of the debt that it rates. This produces a temptation to give a better-
than-deserved rating to increase its customer base and generate more revenue.  
A second conflict is that, as previously mentioned, the fee charged by the ratings agency is 
a proportion of the value of the issue. As highly rated issues are more valuable than lower-
rated issues, this tends to give the ratings agency an incentive to rate the issue more 
highly than it would if it were paid a flat fee, independent of the value of the issue. 
A third conflict of interest is that the ratings agencies sell consulting services as well as 
ratings. A firm can hire a ratings agency to advise it on how to attain a rating and then use 
the same ratings agency to provide a rating. This may provide ratings agencies with an 
incentive to give better-than-deserved ratings to companies that purchase their advisory 
services and firms may feel pressured to purchase these services if they want good ratings. 
A fourth type of conflict is that the management of the ratings agencies may have entirely 
too cosy a personal or professional relationship with the management of the firms that they 
rate. The saga of Moody’s and MCI WorldCom is a particularly egregious example.3 It is 
common for credit ratings agency board members to serve in various positions for their 
corporate clients. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. served as chairman of Moody’s from Oct 2000 to 
Oct 2003. In addition, for almost 20 years up until the end of 2001, he was a member of 
the board first of MCI Communications and then of MCI WorldCom after MCI 
Communication’s merger with World Com. Throughout this period Moody’s gave good 
ratings to the communications company, continuing to do so even after the market treated 
its debt as junk. It was only in May 2002 that Moody’s finally lowered its credit rating to 
sub-investment grade. On 21 Jul 2002 MCI WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection, at the time the largest such filing in US history.  
A fifth conflict of interest is in sovereign debt ratings. Here the ratings agencies may be 
rating actual or potential regulators. Consequently they may have an incentive to placate 
them. That this happens, however, is not obvious. Standard & Poor’s was willing to infuriate 
US policymakers with its recent downgrade of US sovereign debt.  
A related sixth possible conflict is that Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are headquartered in 
New York and Fitch is dual headquartered in New York and Paris. More than half of the big 
three firms’ revenue comes from the United States. This suggests that the big three might 
favour US firms, especially firms in regulated industries such as banking and insurance that 
have US regulators and supervisors. However Véron (2011) argues that the management 
of the big three ratings agencies is multinational and there is little reason to believe that US 
institutions or the US sovereign are favoured.  
If ratings agencies were solely dependent on their reputational capital, it is likely that the 
temptation to bias their ratings would be mitigated by the need to rate issues correctly if 
they wanted to survive and prosper. However, as long as a ratings agency possesses the 
regulatory license conferred by being an arbiter of whether or not an issue conforms to 
legal and regulatory guidelines, the ratings agency is apt to flourish whether or not its 
ratings are based on an unbiased view. Thus, it is not clear whether a ratings agency has 
an incentive to shade the ratings of good customers or not. In the industry’s favour, Covitz 
and Harrison (2003) look at 2000 ratings changes between 1997 and 2002 and conclude 
that they appear to be primarily motivated by ratings agencies’ desires to maintain their 
reputations rather than by conflicts of interest. 
                                                 
3 This story is told in Klein (2004b). 
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3.4 Do Ratings Agencies Extort Their Clients? 
Along with being seem as incompetent, credit ratings agencies have been accused of 
behaviour that is overtly criminal. It particular it has been alleged that they extort firms 
that do not pay for ratings by giving them unsolicited ratings that are lower 
than they deserve.  
The typical scenario in the credit ratings industry is that a firm approaches a ratings 
agency, pays a fee, provides private information and receives a rating. Sometimes, 
however, ratings agencies provide the rating for free without being asked to and without 
being given private information. This may lead firms to fear that if they do not purchase a 
rating they will be given one anyway and it will be less favourable than if they had paid. 
Two examples show that these fears may be rational.4  
The first example involves a 1996 court case. The Jefferson county, Colorado school district 
hired Standard & Poor’s and Fitch to rate its bonds after having used Moody’s in the past. It 
priced its bonds and they sold well until Moody’s issued an unsolicited “negative outlook”. 
The school district was forced to lower the price of its bonds and it took Moody’s to court. 
The ratings agency argued that its opinions were protected by the First Amendment right to 
free speech and the judge agreed.  
In the second example, in 1998 Moody’s informed the German insurance company 
Hannover Re that it would rate its debt for free, but looked forward to the day that the 
company would be willing to pay. Hannover Re was already paying large sums to Standard 
& Poor’s and A. M. Best Co. (a specialist rater of insurance companies) and declined the 
offer. Moody’s responded by rating Hannover Re’s debt a notch below the rating given by 
Standard & Poor’s. Over the years Hannover Re maintained good ratings from the two 
agencies that it paid while its rating from Moody’s steadily declined; Moody’s kept 
pressuring Hannover Re to purchase its services and the German firm kept refusing. 
Finally, in March 2003 Moody’s cut Hannover Re’s debt to junk, wiping ten percent off the 
value of its stock. 
While these examples are alarming, it is unclear whether they are unusual events or 
whether the threat of receiving a poor rating is pervasive, perhaps so pervasive that 
unsolicited ratings are uncommon. One might wonder why a credit ratings agency would go 
to the trouble of issuing a rating without payment, other than to pose a threat. Ironically, 
however, US credit ratings agencies rely on being identified as financial commentators, 
similar to Reuters and the Wall Street Journal, to be able to argue that their ratings are 
free speech and that, consequently, they cannot be held legally liable for them. Issuing 
unsolicited ratings makes them appear more like commentators. 
Testing whether rating firms systematically extort – explicitly or implicitly – client firms to 
purchase ratings is difficult. If an econometrician found that unsolicited ratings were lower 
than solicited ratings this could be for any of three reasons. First, it might be extortion. 
Second, there may be sample bias. It might be that good quality firms solicit ratings to 
signal that they are good quality firms. Third, when a firm solicits a rating it provides the 
rating firm with private information which may make it easier for the rating firm to provide 
a better evaluation. Poon (2003) uses data from 265 firms in 15 countries rated by 
Standard and Poor’s over the period 1998 to 2000 and finds that unsolicited ratings are 
lower than solicited ones but that most of the difference is due to selection bias. Fairchild et 
al (2009), however, use a data set consisting of Japanese firms rated by Moody’s and 
conclude that, even after correcting for sample bias, the unsolicited ratings are lower than 
solicited ones. 
                                                 
4 These examples are recounted in Klein (2004a). 
PE 464.461 47 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3.5 The Role of Credit Ratings agencies in the Financial Crisis 
Credit ratings agencies may have played a prominent role in the financial crisis. In this 
subsection I look at their involvement in structured investment products. 
Partnoy (2006, 2009) argues that the importance attached to credit ratings played a key 
role in the growth of the dysfunctional market for collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). 
A CDO is created by setting up a special purpose entity that issues securities to investors in 
different tranches and uses the proceeds to purchase fixed-income securities. Investors are 
then paid off sequentially, depending on their tranche, so that those in lower tranches take 
losses before those in higher tranches. The volume of CDOs grew rapidly before the debt 
crisis. There were two reasons for this growth. The first was that banks wanted to get 
assets off their balance sheets to reduce their regulatory capital requirements. The second 
was arbitrage. Banks were able to create fixed-income structures where the combined 
worth of the tranches issued greatly exceeded the cost of the underlying assets. In 
synthetic CDOs no actual fixed-income securities were actually purchased. Instead the 
same credit exposure was attained by selling insurance on fixed-income securities using 
CDSs. Therefore the motivation appears to have been entirely arbitrage. But, how did those 
who structured these CDOs produce the magic of the whole being greater than the sum of 
the parts? In some CDOs the underlying securities were tranches of securities issued by 
other CDOs or even tranches backed by tranches backed by securities issued by other 
CDOs, making the transformation particularly hard to understand.  
The key to the increase in value was not some traditional market failure such as illiquidity 
but rather the relationship between the credit ratings on the CDO’s tranches and those on 
the underlying assets. The goal was to take underlying assets with a relatively low credit 
rating and produce a CDO with a large tranche that had a much better credit rating. 
Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) document the mismatch that was achieved. They collected 
data on 3912 tranches of CDOs primarily backed by loans and found that 70.7 percent of 
the value of the securities issued by these CDOs were rated AAA while 85 percent of the 
collateral on the underlying loans supporting the tranches had a B rating, eight percent had 
a BB rating and for the rest the data were missing.  
How was the alchemy of turning underlying junk into AAA tranches achieved? Since both 
bankers and credit ratings agencies earned huge fees from an increase in value, they had 
an incentive to use flawed models that would produce the desired transformation. The 
ratings agencies would produce an imperfect methodology, perhaps one that depended on 
inapplicable historical assumptions, and then the bankers who produced the CDOs would 
choose the underlying securities and the structure to create an outcome consistent with 
both high fees for those involved and an appealing return for investors. 
Ironically, the banks sometimes even managed to fool themselves with their transformative 
sorcery. Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the Swiss bank UBS has been forced to 
write down about USD 50 billion of mortgage-related assets and, at the end of 2007, 'super 
senior' tranches contributed to about half of this loss. The super senior tranche is the most 
protected tranche of a CDO, receiving payment before all other tranches, although there is 
still potential risk. When UBS's investment banking unit considered the riskiness of the 
super senior tranches for its value at risk analysis it used the AAA ratings assigned to these 
tranches by Moody's and Standard & Poor’s. It appears that the unit made no attempt 
whatsoever to investigate the fundamentals of the US housing market.5 
                                                 
5 See Shefrin (2009). 
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3.6 Are Investors Overly Reliant on Ratings? Is the Market? 
The letter grade given to a bond issue indicates solely the ratings agency’s assessment of 
the likelihood of a default. There are inherent problems in relying on the grade as an 
assessment of risk.  
One problem is that ratings merely give a measure of the likelihood of a default. But, they 
A second related problem is that for an individual market participant the assessed 
ated with a default depends on the expected 
loss conditional on a default occurring or, equivalently, on the recovery rate in the event of 
s subsection that the staff of a large investment bank was able to 
fool themselves into thinking that their senior tranches of CDOs were safe because they 
cally variables that are 
                                                
do not say if the issuer is more likely to default in good times or in bad times. A default in 
good times is less harmful than a default in bad times so if two firms have the same 
probability of defaulting, but one defaults in good times and one in bad then all other things 
being equal the value of the bonds of the firm that defaults in good times should be worth 
more than the value of the bonds of the firm that defaults in bad times.6  
probability that default will occur can say little about how purchasing this bond will affect 
the riskiness of his portfolio. To see this, imagine a world where it will either be sunny all 
next year with high probability or rainy all next year with low probability. Umbrella bonds 
are rated junk because umbrella companies default in the likely event of sun; beach ball 
bonds are highly rated because beach ball companies only default in the unlikely case of 
rain. For a beach chair manufacturer, however, it can be less risky to buy the junk umbrella 
bonds than the higher rated beach ball bonds. 
A third problem is that the financial loss associ
a default. A low probability of default, but with a low recovery rate if default occurs, may be 
more damaging than a higher probability of default but with a lower expected loss, if the 
default occurs. A fourth problem is that the rating says nothing about the risk of price 
volatility or illiquidity.  
Recall from the previou
had a AAA rating even though it was they who had contrived to make AAA tranches out of 
junk. Paying inordinate attention to ratings appears to have been part of the culture of the 
financial sector.7 This culture could not only be harmful to an individual institution that puts 
too much weight on ratings, it could affect the market as well. There is no substitute for 
due diligence by investors or their agents engaging in fundamental analysis to evaluate 
default risk and other relevant characteristics of the bonds they are considering investing 
in. Ratings too often make for lazy and careless investors. 
The possible over-importance of and over-reliance on credit ratings raise the possibility that 
credit rating changes could be sunspots. Sunspots are typi
intrinsically unimportant to the economic environment but that can affect the economic 
outcome anyway, even when market participants are rational. They can also be variables 
that have some intrinsic importance but affect markets far more than they would solely do 
in their role as fundamentals. Given that credit rating changes convey some information, 
we would expect price movements after a ratings change. But, it appears that they could 
have a far greater influence than simply disseminating information. 
 
6 See Morrison (2009). 
7 See Partnoy (2009). 
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Financial asset markets can be driven by fear and ebullience. A borrower, be it a firm or 
sovereign, might be able to pay its debt as long as it faces reasonable borrowing costs. But 
if all market participants were to believe that it is unlikely to be able to pay, then it will not 
face reasonable borrowing costs and it defaults. The markets expectations are self-fulfilling. 
Normally fear-driven outcomes do not occur without a reason. Credit ratings, however, are 
sufficiently important that a change in a rating might be such a reason. 
While it seems theoretically possible, there is little evidence yet that credit rating changes 
have acted as sunspots. Véron (2011) argues that it is not obvious that any sovereign 
downgrade has had a significant effect on market sentiment during the current 
euro-area crisis. 
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4. HOW CAN THE CREDIT RATINGS INDUSTRY BE 
IMPROVED?  
The results of the last section suggest that the credit ratings industry is probably conveying 
useful information. Its natural oligopoly structure is not obviously undesirable, although of 
course competition authorities should punish any observed anti-competitive behaviour. The 
main problems are possible conflicts of interest; some egregious examples of bad 
behaviour; the involvement of the industry in creating structural investment products; and 
an over-reliance on credit ratings.  
4.1 Getting Rid of Conflicts of Interest, Egregious Bad Behaviour 
and the Credit-Ratings industry’s Involvement in Creating 
Structured Investment Products 
Credit rating firms should be registered with the SEC in the United States and the ESMA in 
the European Union. To maintain registered status they should have to provide regular 
evidence of competency. However, the restrictive NRSRO designation should be eliminated 
in the United States. This would boost competition and help ease the problem of over-
reliance on credit ratings. 
To remove the conflicts of interest, registered credit rating agencies should only be allowed 
to provide ratings to firms and other debt-issuing entities, including sovereigns. They 
should not be allowed to provide consulting services and they should not be allowed to 
assist in building structured investment products. Senior managers of registered credit 
rating agencies should not be allowed to sit on the boards of any company issuing debt 
rated by a registered credit rating agency. Firms should rotate credit ratings agencies on a 
specified regular basis. This will solve both the problem of rating firms being tempted to 
give clients overly good ratings and it will help solve the problem of credit ratings agencies 
extorting potential clients.8  
Registered firms should not be allowed to provide unsolicited ratings if their business model 
is payment by the issuers of securities. They should only be allowed to provide unsolicited 
ratings if their business model is payment by the investing public. This would solve the 
problem of extortion and end market confusion on how to interpret unsolicited ratings. It 
will also firmly establish that registered credit rating agencies that are paid by the issuers 
are not financial commentators and, therefore, are not protected from being sued in court 
for egregious behaviour on free speech grounds. 
Not allowing registered firms to do anything but rate would end their involvement in 
structured investment products. However, there may be an argument for disallowing the 
issuance of any financial products which exist solely due to rating arbitrage. Synthetic 
CDOs and CDOs raised to any power greater than one should be illegal unless a financial 
institution can demonstrate some other reason for their existence.  
4.2 Solving the Problem of the Over Reliance on Ratings 
Credit ratings gained undue importance when ratings and rating requirements became 
common place in legislation and contracts.  Examples include their use in determining 
Basel II capital requirements and the ECB’s use of them in determining what collateral was 
acceptable in its lending operations. To get rid of this undesirable legislative and regulation-
driven importance of ratings – a result of dysfunctional private provision of public goods - 
these rules and regulations should be rewritten where possible. 
                                                 
8 If either of these problems were more severe than they appear to be, the SEC or ESMA could allocate firms to 
ratings agencies. 
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The problem is that clarity and fairness are frequently enhanced by a precise specification. 
In contracts a precise specification is a key. To a great extent, however, it may be possible 
to replace ratings with a market-based measure such as bond spreads. The problem with 
this is that in periods of illiquidity markets may become dysfunctional. In these rare times 
the regulatory authority might be given the power to temporarily replace spreads 
with ratings.  
4.3 What Does the ECB Think? 
The ECB is concerned with financial firms’ and markets’ over-reliance on credit ratings.9 It 
would like financial firms to undertake their own internal risk assessments and wishes to 
reduce the reliance of both regulation and private contracts on credit ratings. It expresses 
caution, however, about the use of market indicators instead of credit ratings, saying that 
they can be misleading in times of dislocation. 
It believes the credit ratings agencies should produce sovereign ratings more frequently in 
times of crisis; sovereigns should be notified before publication; the markets should be told 
if sovereign ratings are unsolicited and how their procedures differ for unsolicited ratings.  
With regard to the process of rating sovereign debt the ECB says10 
'The Eurosystem fully supports measures aimed at increasing the disclosure, 
transparency and clarity of methodologies, models and assumptions parameters 
surrounding the approach adopted by each CRA.'  
The ECB is concerned about the oligopolistic structure of the credit ratings industry and 
advocates forcing hired credit ratings agencies to share the private information that they 
obtain from a firm with other credit ratings agencies so that these other agencies could also 
rate the firm and build a reputation.11 
While most of the ECB’s suggestions are reasonable, the need to notify sovereigns before 
the publication of a rating is not. Clearly, the opportunities for corruption would be endless, 
both in the rating agencies and in the national ministries of finance, if such highly market-
sensitive information as an impending rating change were to be provided to the sovereign 
before it becomes public knowledge!  
The European Commission has also proposed suspending ratings when a country is 
negotiating a programme with the troika (EC, ECB and IMF) or when a country is under a 
programme. Like the ECB, it proposes that the sovereign be notified before a new rating is 
published. Both these ideas are ill-conceived, indeed terrible. When a country is negotiating 
a programme or is on a programme it is likely to be in deep sovereign or external debt 
trouble and uncertainly is high. This is when investors need information the most if they are 
to take informed positions and when the value of ratings is greatest. The ECB is right that 
ratings should be more frequent during such periods.  
                                                 
9 For the ECB’s opinions, see ECB (2011): 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ecpublicconsultationcreditratingagencieseurosystemreplyen.pdf 
10 ECB (2011, p. 5). 
11Perhaps, however, this would induce firms to be less forthcoming with their private information. 
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4.4 Should the ECB take the role of an independent provider of 
sovereign risk ratings? Should a new independent European 
Credit Ratings agency? 
The European Commission floated the rather preposterous idea that it might be “useful to 
explore ways in which the ECB would provide ratings to be used for regulatory purposes by 
European financial institutions.”12 The ECB is not interested, stating bluntly, “The ECB 
should not issue public ratings to be used for regulatory purposes.”13  The ECB is quite 
right for two reasons. The first is that the ECB is the entity that was too squeamish to 
haircut the Greek debt presented to it as collateral. At the Dec 2005 post-policy press 
conference President Trichet explained: 
'We thought that this was not appropriate. We said that it was not 
appropriate for us to invent a new sanction that would apply for non-
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact via this collateral 
mechanism. We felt that we should not do that.'  
It is apparent that the ECB would find it difficult to downgrade a Member State’s debt. It 
cannot be expected to provide ratings that are not politically motivated. In addition, the 
ECB has been acting as market maker of last resort in sovereign debt markets and as 
lender of last resort for market-impaired sovereigns since the inception of the Securities 
Markets Programme in May 2010, and it now owns around EUR 200 billion worth of 
peripheral euro area sovereign debt outright, in addition to having many hundreds of 
billions of euro’s worth of exposure to these same sovereigns through sovereign debt 
offered as collateral to the Eurosystem by banks that are themselves likely to fail should 
the sovereigns whose debt they offer as collateral fail. The ECB would therefore be clearly 
conflicted if it had a sovereign debt rating role. 
The second reason that the ECB would not be a good provider of sovereign debt ratings is 
that the transparency that the ECB has called for from providers of sovereign debt raters is 
not its own strong suit. Most of the world’s major central banks are opaque, but the ECB 
stands out as possibly the least open and transparent of the lot. We are still waiting to 
learn about the methodologies, models and assumptions parameters that the ECB uses to 
determine the theoretical prices for the illiquid marketable securities and the haircuts on 
collateral that it uses in its lending operations. We are still waiting to hear whether we shall 
ever find out exactly what securities the Eurosystem has bought under the SMP, from 
whom it bought these securities and at what prices. The same holds for the securities 
offered as collateral in its repos and other collateralised transactions, both at the 
Eurosystem and at the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) facilities run by the national 
central banks (NCBs) of an increasing number of euro area Member States.14  
It has been proposed that a new European Credit Ratings agency could be established. The 
ECB rightly questions the independence of a partially publically funded entity. It also notes 
the difficulty and expense in setting up such an agency and the long time it would take for 
the agency to become operative. It also makes the reasonable point that such a semi-
public entity might raise the barriers to entry, decreasing competition rather than 
increasing it. 
                                                 
12 ECB (2011, p. 12). 
13 ECB (2011, p. 7). 
14 Although the ELA’s assets are notionally an exposure of the NCBs and of the sovereigns that guarantee this 
exposure, in practice, with quite a few of the guarantor sovereigns themselves insolvent or at material risk of 
insolvency, the ELAs’ exposure is likely to revert to the Eurosystem, and ought to be accounted for by the ECB to 
the European Parliament and the European citizen and tax payer.   
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Abstract 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have not consistently met the expectations placed on them 
by investors and policymakers. It is difficult, however, to improve the quality of ratings 
through regulatory initiatives. In the short term, changes to the CRAs’s regulatory 
environment, in a context of high market uncertainty, may add to market stress. The role 
of credit ratings in regulation should be reduced but eliminating it entirely would have 
significant downsides, at least in the short term. The transfer of ratings responsibility to 
public authorities, including the European Central Bank, is unlikely to be a good 
alternative because of inherent conflicts of interest. The notion of risk-free sovereign 
bonds is challenged by the crisis, but the most straightforward way to address this 
challenge in the euro area context would be the establishment of a euro-area-wide 
sovereign bond instrument. 
PE 464.461 55 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 57 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 58 
 
2. 
4. ASSUMPTION OF AN EXPLICIT RATING ROLE BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 63 
N
BACKGROUND AND AIM 58 
1. THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS ON THE SOVEREIGN 
BOND MARKETS 59
REDUCING OVER-RELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS 61 
3. A EUROPEAN RATING FOUNDATION 62 
CO CLUSIONS 64 
REFERENCES 65 
PE 464.461 56 
Rating Agencies and Sovereign Credit Risk Assessment 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
CDS Credit Default Swap 
CRAs Credit Rating Agencies 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECON Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
EURIX European Rating Index 
FSB Financial Stability Board 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PE 464.461 57 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This policy brief provides a critical discussion of credit rating agencies and sovereign credit 
risk assessment. Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have not consistently met the expectations 
placed on them by investors and policymakers. This has been most evident in the case of 
the US sub-prime mortgage ratings but also in the erroneous announcement by Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) to some of its clients of a downgrade of France. 
Credit rating agencies derive some of their importance from the fact that the regulatory 
system relies on their assessments. Reducing this reliance in the long term is desirable. 
However, robust alternative assessments of risk will need to be developed. In the short 
term, frequent changes to the CRAs’s regulatory environment, in a context of high market 
uncertainty, may add to market stress. Moreover, improving the quality of ratings through 
regulatory initiatives on other fronts may also not be easy. 
The transfer of ratings responsibility to public authorities, including the European Central 
Bank, is not compelling because of inherent conflicts of interest. Even more worryingly, a 
rating given by such a public authority may undermine the trust in the authority in case of 
errors of judgment which cannot be securely ruled out. Creating a completely separate 
public CRA may also not be desirable as it is unlikely to be perceived as free from conflicts 
of interest, in particular when rating sovereigns.  
The notion of risk-free sovereign bonds is challenged by the crisis. The most 
straightforward way to address this challenge in the euro area context would be the 
establishment of a euro-area-wide sovereign bond instrument. Clearly a large part of 
current sovereign bond market volatility results from conflicting political signals as regards 
the further treatment of the sovereign debt of euro area member states. 
BACKGROUND AND AIM 
Sovereign credit ratings have been in the spotlight since the start of the European 
This note attempts to clarify key policy questions related to sovereign credit ratings. It 
 
sovereign debt crisis, and have received considerable attention from both the media and 
the political community. The European Union has been an active legislator on ratings with 
the adoption of the first (November 2009) and second (May 2011) Regulations on Credit 
Rating Agencies, and proposals for a third published by the European Commission in 
November 2011. The European Parliament has been an active participant in this process, 
including the adoption in March 2011 of a Report on Credit Rating Agencies 
(2010/2302(INI)) by its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).  
leaves aside broader policy challenges posed by credit rating agencies which are not 
specifically related to the sovereign credit segment. These have been reviewed in a 
separate Bruegel publication (Véron, 2011).  
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1. THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS ON THE 
SOVEREIGN BOND MARKETS  
Credit rating agencies have been repeatedly blamed for causing or exacerbating negative 
market developments in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis1. Some recent 
developments, in particular the erroneous announcement by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) to 
some of its clients of a downgrade of France, have added to volatility.  
However, the question of the extent to which credit ratings exacerbate fluctuations in 
sovereign credit markets is far from trivial. Consensus on sovereign bond markets often 
evolves faster than credit ratings, which tend to typically be “behind the curve”. Negative 
ratings decisions are often made after the deterioration of market-based credit indicators. 
This has been a consistent pattern since the start of the financial crisis. In that sense, 
ratings can be considered as lagging indicator that often show only information that is 
already known by the market.  
When negative ratings decisions are made, they are unsurprisingly generally associated 
with yield increases (an outlier was the downgrade of the United States by S&P in early 
August 2011, which was associated with a general increase in risk aversion and lower yields 
on US bonds because of their safe-haven status). This effect is confirmed by recent studies 
such as those published by the International Monetary Fund (Arezki, Candelon & Sy, 2011) 
or the European Central Bank (Afonso, Furceri & Gomes, 2011). However, the extent of this 
impact is less clear. In particular, the ECB study notes that negative ratings decisions tend 
to be preceded by negative market developments, raising questions about the direction of 
causality. Consistent with previous literature, the ECB paper confirms the existence of a 
significant reaction, on the part of both sovereign yields and CDS spreads, to rating 
announcements (this is true in particular for negative events). The analysis goes a step 
further since it assesses if both sovereign yields and CDS spreads had already absorbed the 
information contained in changes to ratings before their announcement. As regards the 
anticipation mechanism, the main result is that the information contained in rating 
announcements is not anticipated by the credit market while the CDS market seems to 
anticipate the information contained in rating downgrades. The ECB study specifically 
investigated the issue of causality between ratings changes and yields/CDS spread over the 
short-term and concluded that there is “two-way causality between sovereign credit ratings 
and government bond yield spreads”, namely that “past values of changes in yield (CDS) 
spreads are significant determinants of the change in effective rating and vice-versa” 
(Afonso, Furceri & Gomes, 2011).  
Furthermore, this is not a static picture as investors’ behaviour changes over time. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests a gradually reduced dependence on credit ratings since the 
start of the euro-area crisis. For example, some large investors appear to have moved 
away from relying on ratings-based sovereign-bond benchmarks indices to form their own 
benchmarks with no reliance on ratings. Strikingly, some negative ratings decisions during 
the past 18 months have had negligible market impact, suggesting that many 
commentators’ emphasis on “mechanical effects” does not capture the complexity of 
linkages. It is to be noted, in particular, that the above mentioned IMF and ECB analyses 
are based on data series stopping in May and October 2010 respectively, and therefore do 
not include observations of the latest 12 months of the crisis. This is significant as, 
                                                            
1 See, for example, Nowotny, July 2011, “It is all apparent from public statistics and whether these statistics are 
accurate or not, the rating agencies... do not give any more intrinsic knowledge, they simply give opinion. And 
these opinions, they continue to give them in such a way that it worsens the crisis”(available at 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/ecb-nowotny-idINLDE76B1Q320110712). 
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especially after the G20 Deauville declaration of 18 October 2010, market developments 
appeared to be driven more by political pronouncements and less by ratings decisions. The 
Bank for International Settlements has concluded that the Deauville declaration had 
significant market impact (BIS, 2010).  
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2. REDUCING OVER-RELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS 
Credit rating agencies derive some of their importance from the fact that the regulatory 
s are indeed undesirable, 
t is to be expected that ratings will be complemented with other 
full implementation of the 
                                                           
system relies on their assessments. This reliance is observed in bank regulation, which in 
some circumstances sets banks’ capital requirements in relation to asset risks as assessed 
by CRAs. Similar regulations exist for insurance and other financial market participants. 
Following the failures of ratings in the US sub-prime mortgage-based securities market, 
significant work has been undertaken by regulators and supervisors, at the global level and 
on both sides of the Atlantic, to reduce regulatory reliance on credit ratings. The most 
radical initiative so far has been the decision by the US Congress to ask federal supervisors 
to eliminate all references to credit ratings in their rules (Section 939A of the US Dodd-
Frank Act of July 2010). However, implementing this decision is proving difficult, not least 
because it impedes the adoption by the US of global supervisory standards (“Basel 2.5” and 
Basel III) which do refer to credit ratings2. At the global level, a review of this issue by the 
Financial Stability Board has concluded that “in certain cases, it may take a number of 
years for market participants to develop enhanced risk management capability so as to 
enable reduced reliance on credit rating agencies” (FSB, 2010).  
One problem is that, while references to risk ratings in regulation
the alternatives might be even worse. In particular, banks’ own models of risk assessment 
have been proven in the crisis to be even less reliable than credit ratings, including in the 
largest banks where risk management was widely believed to be most advanced (see for 
example UBS, 2008). Replacing references to ratings with references to market-based risk 
indicators may sharply increase pro-cyclicality, as such indicators are typically much more 
volatile than credit ratings (see for example Moody’s, 2009, in the case of 
corporate ratings).  
As a consequence, i
measures of risk, but that a complete elimination of references to credit ratings from the 
European financial rulebook would appear both impractical and undesirable given the lack 
of proper alternatives in many cases. Moreover, contemplating such steps in the current 
period of market stress may contribute to short-term volatility.  
In particular, the EU and its member states should proceed with 
“Basel 2.5” and Basel III accords, including the extent to which these still refer to the use 
of credit ratings in spite of the Basel Committee’s efforts to reduce reliance. These efforts 
by the Basel Committee and other international financial standards-setters are expected to 
continue and to bring gradual improvements in the years to come. Opting for a complete 
elimination of any regulatory reference to credit ratings in the short term would have 
significant downsides.  
 
2 Westlake M. (2011), “Dodd-Frank stalls US move to Basel trading book rules”, Global Risk Regulator, September 
. 
PE 464.461 61 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. A EUROPEAN RATING FOUNDATION 
In a resolution adopted in June 2011, the European Parliament asked the European 
Commission to study the creation of a new fully-independent European Credit Rating 
Foundation (European Parliament, 2011). The resolution does not include an explicit 
deadline for this. The Commission's proposal for a third EU Regulation of CRAs (CRA3) does 
not retain the option of EU-level public sponsorship of a new CRA: “This proposal is not 
aimed at setting up a European credit rating agency. As requested by the European 
Parliament in its report on credit rating agencies of 8 June 2011, this option was assessed 
in detail in the impact assessment accompanying this proposal. The impact assessment 
found that even if a publicly funded CRA may have some benefits it terms of increasing the 
diversity of opinions in the rating market and providing an alternative to the issuer pays 
model, it would be difficult to address concerns relating to conflicts of interest and its 
credibility, especially if such CRA would rate sovereign debt. However, these findings 
should by no means discourage other actors from setting up new credit rating agencies. 
The Commission will monitor to what extent new private entrants in the credit rating 
market will provide for more diversity” (European Commission, 2011). In June, the 
Parliament also proposed to establish a European rating index (EURIX), incorporating all 
ratings of registered CRAs that are available on the market (European Parliament, 2011). 
Indeed, while more competition in the credit ratings market is desirable, it is not clear that 
this can be achieved through a public initiative. A publicly-sponsored ratings agency would 
be assumed by market participants to be politically constrained in its credit assessments 
and would therefore struggle to make a difference in terms of market perceptions – 
especially in a context in which there is a widespread perception that EU authorities are 
tempted to increase political leverage over ratings decisions generally, as illustrated by the 
debate on the preparation of the CRA 3 Regulation before the publication of the European 
Commission’s proposal in mid-November 2011.  
Incidentally, it is not clear that a specialisation in sovereign ratings could represent a 
sustainable business model for a financially independent ratings agency. Sovereign ratings 
by the three most established CRAs do not generate significant revenue3. CRAs rate the 
largest sovereigns not as a direct revenue generator, but because it is a necessary building 
block for other, more lucrative ratings segments such as those of corporate issuers. Indeed, 
many sovereign ratings are unsolicited, especially for the largest sovereign issuers, and as 
a consequence they are a pure cost centre for the CRAs. The low financial dependence on 
sovereign ratings also results in less obvious conflicts of interest in rating sovereigns than 
in other segments of CRA activity. 
                                                            
3 No public figures are available but anecdotal evidence suggests that revenue generated by sovereign ratings is 
no more than a few percent at most of the leading ratings agencies’ total revenue.  
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4. ASSUMPTION OF AN EXPLICIT RATING ROLE BY 
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
If a public authority such as the ECB or the IMF were to publish sovereign credit ratings, it 
B’s collateral 
                                                           
is likely that they would be considered by market investors very differently from those 
assigned by private-sector CRAs, if only because both institutions are at least potentially 
able to directly impact sovereign creditworthiness with their own policy decisions, and 
because sovereigns participate in both institutions’ governance. According to a report from 
the House of Lords, the IMF (or OECD) cannot avoid conflicts of interests by acting as 
rating agency because it is involved in providing money to the EU and because its 
constituencies and effective owners are the governments themselves (House of Lords, 
2011). In addition, the IMF’s or ECB’s credibility would suffer if their ratings were to be 
seen as inadequate following developments happening after their publication. 
One specific issue that has been in the spotlight in recent months is the EC
policy, which has required successive revisions as the sovereign ratings of euro-area 
countries, in particular Greece, have been downgraded. The consequence has been that the 
ECB’s criteria for the acceptance of collateral have been much less reliant on credit ratings 
in practice than they had appeared to be in principle. An influential paper by Buiter and 
Sibert (2005) has even gone as far as to argue that the ECB’s own collateral policy for its 
repo operations has contributed to some of the fiscal indiscipline observed before the crisis 
because it insufficiently discriminates between euro-area sovereign bonds. 
A related issue is the risk-weighting of euro-area sovereign debt in banks’ capital 
calculations, for which the current zero risk-weighting under the applicable Capital 
Requirements Directives appears increasingly at odds with financial reality. The Deputy 
Director-General of the Bank for International Settlements, the Chairman of the European 
Banking Authority, and the Chair of the ECON Committee have all been reported as 
advocating a reexamination of the zero risk-weighting policy4. However, this specifically 
applies to the euro area as a unique currency union of large developed economies. The 
fundamental question is not so much the distortions induced by the zero risk-weighting, but 
the absence of an effective risk-free asset in the euro-area financial construct, which one 
might relate to the broader current debate on the design flaws of the euro-area fiscal 
framework. Particularly given current market instability it may therefore be too early to 
envisage a root-and-branch reform of the principles that underpin sovereign credit risk-
weighting in capital regulation, at least as long as the outline of the euro area’s future fiscal 
policy framework remains undetermined (see Tett, 2011, for a broader exposition of this 
argument).  
 
4 See Hickley A. (2011), “MEPs plan revolt on 0% sovereign risk”, GFS News, 21 October; and York N. (2011), 
“BIS blasts EU on 0% sovereign risk”, GFS News, 27 October.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have not consistently met the expectations placed on them 
by investors and policymakers. It is difficult, however, to improve the quality of ratings 
through regulatory initiatives. In the sovereign bond market, CRAs often follow a general 
deterioration in market sentiment. At the same time, major announcements have also 
added to market pressure so that a two-way causality has been established. Ratings 
decisions on sovereigns have a market impact because the financial system partly relies on 
ratings for risk assessment and balance sheet composition. However, reducing the 
regulatory reliance on ratings is not an easy task. The more fundamental question that the 
euro area needs to solve are what a safe euro-area-wide reference asset would look like, 
given that national sovereign bond are ever less able to play this role, and how it could be 
constructed. 
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Abstract 
The European Commission has produced a wide-ranging package of proposals 
aimed at reforming the way credit ratings are issued and used. The Commission’s 
concerns about “hard wiring” of credit ratings into the operation of the financial 
system are well-founded but there are limits and pitfalls to the alternatives that 
they propose. The proposals on sovereign debt are largely unobjectionable but the 
idea that ESMA needs to approve credit risk methodologies is worrying in light of 
the wholly unreasonable criticisms of sovereign downgrades from elite European 
policy makers. Proposals to increase competition via issuers rotating their ratings 
providers are unlikely to do much to improve the quality of ratings unless the 
current issuer-pays model is changed. A more radical reform, involving a move 
towards an investor-pays model, needs to be considered. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
After the global financial crisis triggered by widespread losses on supposedly low risk AAA-
rated structured finance products, enthusiastic supporters of the world’s major credit 
ratings agencies are hard to find.  
By even the most basic microeconomic criteria, the structure of the industry is hardly ideal, 
with the vast majority of ratings provided by the two largest incumbents. Furthermore, 
their funding model, in which almost all the fees are collected from those who issue 
securities rather than those who buy them, leaves the agencies wide open to accusations of 
systematic mis-rating of products in order to generate revenue. 
In light of these problems, it is hardly surprising that the European Union has decided to 
formally regulate the credit ratings agencies via the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA). The European Commission has now put forward a new, more extensive, 
package of proposals which would change the way that ratings are used and provided.1  
As is often the case with these packages, they are mixture of good, bad and indifferent. 
Among the more substantive proposals, the good and indifferent are the following: 
 The proposals to reduce the so-called “hard wiring” dependence of financial 
institutions, regulators and central banks on agency ratings are in line with previous 
recommendations from the Financial Stability Board and other agencies. However, 
the key inappropriate hard wiring that the EU is responsible for—the zero risk-
weight that Euro area banks can apply to European sovereign debt—remains 
in place. 
 Proposals to reduce the reliance of institutions on agency ratings and replace them 
with internal risk models are well-intentioned but seem to underestimate the 
problems associated with the development of in-house risk models as well as their 
oversight by financial supervisors. 
 Proposals to boost competition, via requirements that issuers rotate the agencies 
that rate their securities, may make some limited progress towards the intended 
goal of increased competition. Whether this would lead to higher quality regulations 
is an open question. 
The bad aspects of the package, and the political hype that has surrounded it, relates to 
sovereign ratings. Despite the widespread acceptance that the agencies mislead investors 
by underestimating the credit risk associated with structured finance problems, the political 
discussions surrounding the proposed reforms have focused extensively on the idea that 
the agencies are being too harsh in their assessments of Euro area sovereign risks. This is 
despite the clear risks associated with high debt levels, troubled banks, rising sovereign 
yields and the precedent for private sector involvement set by the Greek situation.  
I believe the reaction of the European policy elite to sovereign downgrades, complete with 
dark murmurings about financial market plots against the euro and the need to have a 
European agency to provide to rate sovereign debt, has been little short of hysterical 
messenger shooting. 
                                                          
1 The full package of Commission proposals as well as explanatory documents are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/agencies/index_en.htm.  
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In light of this background, I am concerned that the Commission’s proposals for ESMA to 
“verify that methodologies and changes to methodologies comply with regulatory 
requirements” could prove to be a vehicle through which European politicians can put 
pressure upon officials to decide that methodologies pointing to ratings downgrades be 
discarded.  
In the rest of this paper, I will first discuss the proposals to reduce institutional dependence 
on agency ratings and then move on to the more delicate problem of sovereign debt 
ratings. I will conclude by discussing the proposals aimed at reforming the structure of the 
credit ratings business. 
2. REDUCING DEPENDENCE ON RATINGS  
2.1  The Role of Ratings in Financial Markets 
The role of ratings agencies in financial markets has evolved considerably over time. The 
agencies started out as relatively small companies offering their opinions to investors on 
the credit quality of borrowers. However, as debt markets grew in size and complexity, the 
agencies became a more systemically important part of the financial system. 
Over time, it became common for ratings to be written into contracts for repurchase 
agreements and derivatives and into the investment mandates of pension funds and life 
insurance companies. In addition, regulators have given quasi-official recognition to the 
role of ratings agencies starting with the introduction of the idea of Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organisations in the US. Agency ratings began to play a role in many 
different aspects of regulation from lower reporting requirements for highly-rated firms 
when issuing bonds to the requirement that money market mutual funds buy only highly-
rated debt and, finally, to the recognition that agency ratings could be used in the 
computation of regulatory capital requirements for commercial banks as part of the 
Basel II agreement. 
There are a number of dangerous aspects to this institutional dependence of financial 
markets on agency ratings. One problem is that the reliance on agencies has the effect of 
reducing the amount of monitoring done by holders of debt instruments. If agencies rate a 
bond AAA then those who run a fund can argue that there is little point in them allocating 
valuable resources doing an independent assessment of a bond that has already been given 
a quasi-official seal of approval. This can lead to a general reduction in the quality of the 
financial system’s assessment of risks and there is little doubt that this occurred with the 
widespread lack of questioning of the quality of structured finance assets during the middle 
of the last decade. 
A second problem created by institutional dependence on ratings is the so-called “cliff 
effect” that occurs when agencies downgrade widely-held financial instruments. The 
downgrade can lead to sales of these assets by funds with restrictions on their investment 
mandates, banks concerned about regulatory capital ratios and institutions using these 
instruments as collateral in repo agreements. This can trigger sharp declines in the value of 
the downgraded instruments which can increase financial market volatility and perhaps 
threaten the solvency of those institutions holding these bonds. A world in which firms 
undertook their own credit assessments, which would change at different times rather than 
all at once, would be less subject to this source of instability. 
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2.2  Proposals to Reduce Dependence 
The Commission’s assessment that there is too much reliance on agency ratings by 
financial institutions and regulators mirrors the previous assessment of the Financial 
Stability Board and other international agencies.2 The key Commission proposal in relation 
to reducing this reliance is a new directive which 
“requires certain financial institutions to make their own credit risk assessment. They 
should therefore avoid relying solely or mechanistically on external credit ratings for 
assessing the creditworthiness of assets.” 
Specifically, the Commission proposes that financial institutions should develop internal 
rating models for use alongside or in place of agency ratings. The Commission’s Impact 
Assessment of these proposals states that 
“the development and use of internal rating models would enhance the capacity for internal 
credit assessment of firms with material and complex credit risk exposures … The internal 
rating models would contribute to ensuring that credit risks are adequately managed.” 
The proposals rely on regulatory supervision to ensure that this approach works well is not 
simply gamed by banks looking to generate extra profits through higher leverage. 
Specifically, the proposals recommend that 
“Competent authorities should supervise the adequacy of these financial firms' credit 
assessment processes including monitoring that financial firms do not over-rely on 
credit ratings.” 
I think there are good reasons to encourage financial institutions to reduce their mechanical 
reliance on agency ratings. However, even with the various official acknowledgements of 
the potential problems with internal models, I think the Commission is over-estimating the 
gains from increased usage of internal models. 
While the past mistakes of ratings agencies are well known, it still must be acknowledged 
that credit risk assessment is a complex business. Most institutions will not have anywhere 
near the resources to devote to credit risk analysis of individual securities that the ratings 
agencies do. One likely outcome will be that institutions will often outsource the provision 
of credit ratings to professional firms who can provide standardised risk assessment 
models, such as the well-known RiskMetrics approach. If the majority of firms are using the 
same modelling approach and this approach proves to be mistaken, the implications are 
likely to be similar to the effects of taking advice on the basis of overly optimistic 
agency ratings. 
Reinforcing this tendency for a lack of diversity in risk assessment will be the fact that 
regulatory agencies are unlikely to be able to put large numbers of supervisors to work 
assessing a wide range of different risk models adopted by the financial institutions they 
regulate. The experience with internal ratings based models in the implementation of 
Basle II is instructive, though there is little reference to it in the Commission’s materials.  
When the use of internal ratings based models was introduced into the Basle II agreement, 
it was accepted that it would not be feasible for supervisors to evaluate a wide range of 
different types of credit risk models. For this reason, to be allowed use internal models for 
regulatory purposes, banks needed to adopt the Value-at-Risk-style model specified in the 
Basle Committee’s 2005 document “An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight 
Functions”.  If this precedent is followed, then it is unlikely that dispensing with the use of 
agency ratings will result in the variety if internal risk assessments that the Commission 
is hoping for. 
                                                          
2 See, for instance, Financial Stability Board (2010). 
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Furthermore, even if a common internal risk assessment model is settled on, there are a 
number of difficulties for supervisors when assessing whether these models are adequately 
implemented. Philipp Hildebrand of the Swiss National Bank provided a useful discussion of 
these issues in a 2008 speech at the LSE. He pointed out that: 
“the increased reliance on banks’ internal models has rendered the job of supervisors 
extraordinarily difficult. First, supervisors have to examine banks’ exposures. Second, they 
have to evaluate highly complex models. Third, they have to gauge the quality of the data 
that goes into the computation of these models. To put it diplomatically, this constitutes a 
formidable task for outsiders with limited resources.” 
Overall, my assessment is that while the proposals to reduce regulatory reliance on ratings 
agencies are welcome, the gains from improved risk management from the proposed 
alternative approach are likely to be fairly small. 
2.3  Zero Sovereign Risk Weights and ECB Collateral Rules 
While the Commission’s assessment that agency ratings are inappropriately “hard-wired” 
into the financial system is undoubtedly correct, it is worth noting that the focus on the use 
of ratings fails to address what is probably the most inappropriate hard-wiring in the 
European financial system, which is the regulatory treatment of sovereign debt 
held by banks. 
The Basle II regulations on the use of the “standardised approach” (i.e. the calculation of 
regulatory capital without use of internal models) are skewed to incentivise banks to hold 
sovereign debt over corporate debt because sovereign bonds are assigned a lower risk 
weight than corporate bonds with the same ratings. For example, sovereign bonds rated 
AAA to AA- receive a zero risk weight, while corporate bonds with the same rating receive a 
20 percent weight; sovereign bonds rated A+ to A- receive a 20 percent risk weight, while 
corporate bonds with the same rating receive a 50 percent weight.3 
The European Union, however, in its implementation of Basle II went well beyond these 
Basle Committee’s guidelines in favouring sovereign debt holdings. The CRD Directive 
(2006/48/EC) that implements regulatory capital requirements in the European Union 
states that4 
“Exposures to Member States' central governments and central banks denominated and 
funded in the domestic currency of that central government and central bank shall be 
assigned a risk weight of 0 %.” 
This approach meant that European banks could consider Greek debt (rated A- in 2009 
even before the crisis unfolded) to have the same risk level as German debt when 
calculating regulatory risk requirements. The failure of stated levels of regulatory capital 
(measured relative to risk weighted assets) to accurately reflect the risk associated with 
sovereign bond holdings has been a continued source of scepticism from international 
markets when assessing the health of European banks. This particular piece of hard wiring 
needs to be removed. 
                                                          
3 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). 
4 eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2006L0048:20100330:EN:PDF 
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It is also likely that this regulation played a role in the general lack of market discipline in 
relation to lower quality Euro area sovereign debt prior to the crisis. Taking on lower-rated 
but high-yielding sovereign debt thus became a cost-free way to increase leverage and the 
return on equity. Admittedly, this increased return comes at the cost of increased credit 
risk but this is a risk many bankers are willing to take given the pressure they are under to 
deliver high returns. 
The incentive to bet on risky European sovereign debt was exacerbated by the European 
Central Bank’s willingness to accept all Euro area sovereign debt as collateral, allowing for a 
form of “carry trade” in which low cost central bank funding was channelled towards 
purchasing higher yielding sovereign debt. 
Of course, recent events have shown that the ECB’s collateral rules are an exception to the 
“hard wiring” of agency ratings into the banking system.  The Eurosystem Credit 
Assessment Framework (ECAF) for deciding on the eligibility of collateral has, in fact, never 
relied in a mechanical fashion on credit agency ratings.5 Rather, the Eurosystem has 
utilised various sources of information in addition to agency ratings, including the judgment 
of a number of national central banks that operate their own in-house credit 
assessment systems. 
That said, the stated intention of the ECB’s collateral rules is to only accept collateral with 
“high credit standards” and it is hard to reconcile this intention with a policy of accepting 
bonds rated at junk status by the ratings agencies. The ECB has decided, however, in the 
case of Greece, Ireland and Portugal to continue accepting junk-rated sovereigns 
as collateral. 
I don’t wish to criticise these decisions. I do believe, however, that the rationale underlying 
them should be explained and the Eurosystem collateral guidelines refined as a result of the 
explanation. As best I can tell, the current preferred argument of ECB officials in relation to 
these decisions is that they are still only accepting high quality assets and that the ratings 
agencies are incorrect about the credit risk on peripheral debt. 
I think this is a poor argument. The credit risk on this debt is very real. A better 
explanation is that the ECB needs to maintain financial stability in the Euro area as part of 
its mandate to maintain price stability and support the other economic goals of the Union. 
The removal of the ability to use sovereign-backed collateral for ECB financing for banks 
from these three countries would have had disastrous effects on the European financial 
system. For this reason, occasional deviations from standard collateral rules are sometimes 
required. Such a “financial stability” exception should be provided for in the official 
guidelines on eligible collateral. 
In the future, however, the ECB should work to limit the exposure of Euro area banks to 
the sovereign debt of their own country. Such investments are a poor risk hedge and, given 
the precedents set by the ECB’s decision to continue accepting junk-rated collateral, it can’t 
be denied that banks loading up on their own country’s sovereign debt represents a source 
of financial risk to all Euro area countries. 
                                                          
5 See Chapter 6 of ECB (2011). 
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3.  SOVEREIGN BOND RATINGS 
3.1  Political Controversy Over Sovereign Ratings 
Given the well-known incentive problems associated with the issuer-pays model, there is a 
general agreement that credit ratings agencies tend to be positively biased in their 
assessments of credit risks. However, over the past year, it has become clear that many 
senior European politicians and bureaucrats believe that the agencies are being far too 
negative in their assessment of the risks associated with Euro area sovereign debt. 
A brief but representative sample can help provide a general idea of the thinking of the 
European policy elite. 
 Jean-Claude Junker, Luxembourg's prime minister and chairman of the Eurogoup of 
finance ministers, speaking in July after Portugal had been downgraded, said that 
rating agencies "are taking steps that do appear to those of us who are involved in 
the solution [to] these problems to be irrational and unreasonable." He also said the 
rating companies’ influence is a “disastrous one” because downgrades might 
discourage governments from taking further reform steps. “So I’m calling them to a 
more responsible behavior”.6  Junker called for setting up a European ratings 
agency, presumably in the expectation that it would provide higher ratings.7 
 Also speaking in July after Portugal’s downgrade, European Commission President 
Manuel Barroso is reported to have said the decision was unhelpful and 
unnecessary, and would only provoke more market speculation against the euro, 
adding: "I think our institutions know Portugal a little bit better: our analysis is more 
refined and complete." A spokesperson for Barroso said about a similar decision on 
Ireland: "The decision to downgrade Ireland's credit rating is, in the president's view 
and the commission's view, incomprehensible. Its timing, as the second quarterly 
review mission is preparing to announce its findings, is, to say 
the least, questionable.” 8 
 Austrian Central Bank Governor Ewald Nowotny has questioned whether there is any 
useful informational content in credit agency sovereign ratings. "It is all apparent 
from public statistics and whether these statistics are accurate or not, the rating 
agencies ... do not give any more intrinsic knowledge, they simply give opinion … 
And these opinions, they continue to give them in such a way that it worsens 
the crisis."9 
 ECB officials regularly get in on the agency-bashing act. Executive Board member 
Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi had criticised the agencies as losing credibility by paying 
attention to bond market yields saying “Some of [their ratings] revisions were not 
based on macro-economic data or new budgets, but on the assessments given by 
the market for sovereign bonds and the possibility of … In this way the agencies 
have not given an independent assessment, but one linked to the market’s 
reaction.”10  Fellow Executive Board member Juergen Stark has also criticised what 
he calls “the pro-cyclical behaviour of rating agencies which in my view is really 
irresponsible" and has said that "For a long period of time (the question has been) 
what do rating agencies know more."11 
                                                          
6 www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-07/juncker-urges-more-efforts-to-create-european-rating-agency-1-.html.  
7 online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110707-709180.html.  
8 www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/07/13/irish-bonds-junk-status-s_n_897498.html.  
9 www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/us-ecb-nowotny-idUSTRE76B6QU20110712.  
10 http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/05/13/ecb-official-lashes-out-at-rating-agencies/  
11 http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/11/ecb-stark-idUSLDE65A0HX20100611.  
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My opinion is that these views represent a combination of shooting the messenger and 
failing to understand the meaning of the message. I would like to make three points on 
this topic. 
1. How Sovereign Defaults Happen 
Consider the criticism that the ratings agencies should not take fluctuations in bond market 
yields into account. I believe this criticism fails to understand the nature of 
sovereign credit risk.  
In many ways, sovereigns are like illiquid banks that rely on the confidence of their 
creditors to keep operating. Their reputation as good credits relies on their ability to tax 
their citizens (and perhaps on their ability to print money via their control of their central 
banks). However, at any point in time, most government revenue is pre-allocated to 
various spending programmes and there are usually severe political limits on the size of tax 
increases and spending cuts that can be implemented at any point in time. This means that 
even governments that are not running deficits are reliant on the confidence of the bond 
market to continue rolling over their existing debts, while those running deficits are even 
more reliant on bond market sentiment. 
Complaints that ratings seem to be coming thick and fast and that these downgrades 
cannot reflect underlying fiscal soundness underestimate the complex “non-linear 
dynamics” of sovereign debt default. A perceived one percent risk of default will add a little 
to a country’s cost of funding but can be dealt with fairly easily. However, a perceived five 
percent risk of default will likely raise the cost of funding to the point where the cost of 
servicing the debt gives rise to fears about debt sustainability. Above these low levels of 
perceived default risk, the probability of default moves very quickly towards one. A 
sovereign can go from being perceived as a low risk to outright default in a short amount of 
time if it is hit with a sufficiently bad set of events.12 
Sovereign defaults in prosperous European countries will not occur because the politicians 
in these countries actively decide to default on their debts. They occur because there is a 
“buyers strike” and the country fails to roll over its debt. The failure to pay out on one 
tranche of bonds then triggers repayment demands on other bonds and the result is a full-
scale debt restructuring, which usually involves significant losses for creditors. 
It is this credit risk that the agencies are measuring. Standard and Poor’s, for instance, 
state that their “credit ratings express the agency’s opinion about the ability and 
willingness of an issuer, such as a corporation or state or city government, to meet its 
financial obligations in full and on time” while Moody’s ratings are largely based on their 
assessment of expected loss.13 
Given that worsening investor sentiment and a buyers strike is the principal source of a 
sovereign being unable to meet obligations, the agencies would be in completely failing to 
do their job if they simply ignored the signals available from bond market yields. Indeed, 
despite the constant drumbeat of criticisms from European officials, the agencies have 
generally been slow to react to worsening market conditions. In most cases, European 
sovereigns have already had secondary market bond yields equivalent to more poorly rated 
credits for some time before the agencies have downgraded. 
                                                          
12 See Flood and Marion (2009) for a nice discussion of the analytics of how a debt default can come about quickly. 
13 See http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us#def_1 and 
http://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/2000400000300541.pdf 
for documentation. 
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2. Informal Content 
European officials argue that the ratings agencies should simply look at the data on debt 
and deficits as well as the proposed adjustment programmes. It is unclear why they think 
this should produce a better assessment than the agencies are currently providing.  
The European countries rated poorly by the agencies have either high debt burdens by 
historical standards (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Belgium) or banking systems suspected to 
contain large losses (Spain) or extremely poor long-term growth performance (Portugal). In 
relation to planned adjustment programmes, the austerity programmes in Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland have generally been associated with ongoing recession which makes 
stabilisation of the public finances very difficult. So an objective examination of the data 
and adjustment programmes is hardly grounds for rating all these countries highly. 
The idea that agency staff don’t know any more than one can glean from looking at official 
data and policy documents is also unfair. Agency staff rating sovereign debt visit countries 
and speak with government officials as well as taking soundings from private citizens. 
(I have met staff from agencies on their visits to Ireland on a number of occasions and 
have always found them to be well-informed.) Investors have every reason to expect the 
agencies to do more due diligence than simply sitting in their office reading statistics and, 
as far as I can tell, this is certainly happening in relation to Euro area sovereigns. 
It is also worth remembering that Euro area member states with poor finances also no 
longer have access to their own central bank as a source of funding for their deficits. While 
one can object to monetary financing from a social perspective on the grounds that it 
simply generates inflation, it has the advantage of preventing a “sudden stop” leading to 
default. And while investors may get repaid in a devalued currency, debt monetisation 
means the loss is shared with the general public who suffer from higher inflation. That 
the UK, with a high debt ratio and a very high deficit ratio currently has far lower yields 
than any of the high deficit Euro area countries shows the weight that sovereign debt 
investors place on having your own central bank. 
Judged relative to sovereigns in many other parts of the world, the objective debt 
situations of many Euro area countries are consistent with the warnings implicit in the 
ratings provided by the agencies. 
3. Adjustment Programmes and Private Sector Involvement 
The agencies are providing information to private investors. Those European officials who 
criticise the agencies should also be aware that the template they have designed for Euro 
area countries in difficulty is one that is not at all friendly to these investors. 
The European reaction to buyer strikes in Greece, Ireland and Portugal has been to step in 
and provide official funding in conjunction with the IMF. The October 26 agreement on 
Greece sets a template for how debt sustainability problems in these countries are solved if 
they cannot return to the bond market. The IMF, as is the tradition, does not take a loss. 
The EFSF, despite not being a preferred creditor, also does not take a loss. And the ECB 
does not take a loss on its holdings acquired in the Securities Market Programme.  
This leaves private creditors to take all the losses. With high debt burdens and a precedent 
for private sector involvement, it is only appropriate that the credit ratings agencies are 
warning investors about the potential losses associated with default scenarios. 
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3.2  Suggested Changes on Sovereign Ratings 
Set against the ranting of European politicians, the actual proposals from the Commission 
in relation to sovereign debt ratings are pretty sensible.  
Various changes are proposed that may take some of the heat out of the controversy over 
sovereign ratings, such as the proposals that sovereign ratings only be published after the 
close of business and at least one hour before the opening of trading in the EU and that 
they inform issuers at least a full working day before publication. Other proposals, such as 
the requirement to assess sovereign ratings more frequently (every six months instead of 
every twelve months) and the requirement that agencies release information on the 
allocation of staff to the ratings of different asset classes (i.e. corporate, structured finance, 
sovereign ratings) are also perfectly reasonable. However, the gains from these proposals 
will be limited. 
Where I have more concern is with the proposals that ESMA have a role in approving the 
methodologies applied by the agencies. To quote the Executive Summary: 
“Articles 8(5a), 8(6)(aa) and 22a(3) … require the consultation of stakeholders on the new 
methodologies or the proposed changes and on their justification. CRAs should furthermore 
submit the proposed methodologies to ESMA for the assessment of their compliance with 
existing requirements. The new methodologies may only be used once they have been 
approved by ESMA. The rules also require the publication of the new methodologies 
together with a detailed explanation.” 
I have one serious concern about this recommendation. Given the well-aired opinion of 
European politicians and senior ECB officials that ratings agencies should not respond to 
bond market movements, I am concerned that ESMA officials will be negatively disposed 
towards methodologies that depend on this source of information. Given the importance of 
investor sentiment in affecting sovereign default risk, I think such an approach could do 
severe damage to the usefulness of agency ratings. 
Finally in relation to sovereign ratings, one proposal that featured in the consultation 
document but which is not part of the current package is the idea of suspending sovereign 
credit ratings “in situations where the objectivity and quality of sovereign ratings can be 
impaired by upcoming market developments.”  This is a really bad idea. What implicit 
rating do the European authorities imagine an investor will attached to a bond that was 
rated BBB and for whom ratings are now suspended? Not BBB, that’s for sure. 
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4. REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE CRA INDUSTRY 
The Commission’s package also contains a series of proposals aimed at reforming the credit 
ratings industry in Europe and provides material additional discussing the possibility of 
more substantial changes at some later point.  
4.1  Proposed Rotation Rule 
There can be little doubt that the ratings industry exhibits a pretty low level of competition, 
with S&P and Moody’s providing the vast majority of ratings.14 To address this lack of 
competition, the Commission is proposing a series of rules that involve issuers having to 
“rotate” between various ratings providers. According to these regulations 
“The CRA engaged should not be in place for more than 3 years or for more than a year if it 
rates more than ten consecutive rated debt instruments of the issuer. However, this latter 
rule shall not lead to shortening the permitted period of engagement to less than a year. 
Where the issuer solicits more than one rating for itself or for its instrument, be it because 
of a legal obligation to do so or voluntarily, only one of the agencies has to rotate. 
However, the maximum duration for each of these CRAs is fixed at a period of six years.” 
I’ll restrict my comments on these proposals to two observations.  
First, I am not sure that Commission’s diagnosis of the source of competition problems is 
correct. The proposal appears to be based on the assumption that the lack of competition in 
the ratings industry stems from the existence of long-standing “cosy” relations between 
issuers and their raters, in which issuers have become used to Moody’s and\or S&P and the 
agencies are happy to provide good ratings as long as they continue to get business from 
the issuers. 
There may be some truth to this but I don’t think the idea of cosy relationships really 
explains the limited competition in this market. The technical barriers to entry into this 
industry are not so high (it is not so difficult to put together a team of financial experts to 
do this kind of analysis) so it’s not clear from this explanation why there aren’t ten different 
firms each with established long-term cosy relationships with issuers.  
Instead, the literature on the credit ratings industry suggests that the implicit barriers to 
entry associated with reputational issues are considerable.15 As Hill (2011) discusses, one 
can find many examples of financial industry specialists who claim that they felt they “had 
to get Moody’s and S&P to rate their securities” because investors would be suspicious if 
they chose to provide ratings by other less well-known agencies. With this reputational 
advantage, it has been difficult for newcomers to take a lot of business away 
from the incumbents.  
I suspect that these rules will see a lot of businesses rotating between being rated by 
Moody’s to being rated by S&P, with occasional periods in which a solicited rating means it 
is being rated by both of the main agencies. The effects in encouraging the growth of new 
agencies may be limited. 
Second, while in most market settings more competition generally produces better 
outcomes for society, it is not clear that more competition in the credit ratings industry is 
an example of this general rule, at least not under the current issuer-pays model. 
Camanho, Deb and Liu (2009) is a well-reasoned paper that illustrates that ratings are 
even more likely to be inflated if more competitors are introduced into an issuer-pays 
ratings market. The tendencies of issuers to “shop” for ratings and for raters to look to 
                                                          
14 Deb et al (2011) provide an excellent review of the current state of the ratings industry. 
15 See Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009) and Deb et al (2011). 
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keep business by offering a positive credit assessment are greater when there is 
more competition. 
On balance, while I don’t have any great objections to these rules. I’m not sure they will 
create more competition and, if they do, whether this will provide us with 
higher quality ratings. 
4.2  More Radical Reforms? 
The Commission’s consultation document in relation to these proposals put forward some 
ideas for more radical changes to the rating agency industry.  
One of the proposed ideas was to entrust the ECB or national central banks with the job of 
issuing ratings to be used for regulatory purposes. An alternative idea is that the European 
Commission, which is already involved in fiscal policy assessment should provide sovereign 
ratings. I don’t think either of these suggestions are good ones.   
 The ECB has proven itself to be a very poor judge of sovereign default risk via its 
behaviour during the Greek crisis. ECB officials, from Jean-Claude Trichet on down, 
repeated the mantra that there would be no default long after it was clear to 
everyone else that there would be. The ECB already has enough tasks. Let’s keep 
them out of the ratings business. 
 The Commission should also not be involved in providing sovereign ratings. The 
Commission is the EU’s “policeman” in relation to fiscal discipline, though it’s hard to 
argue that it has done this job well. The Commission issuing sovereign downgrades 
would be an admission that it has not done its fiscal policing job well. It would also 
be an acknowledgement of the possibility of sovereign default, a topic most 
bureaucrats prefer to steer clear of. 
Another proposal that did not make the final cut was the establishment of an official 
European Credit Rating Agency initially set up as public\private structure with public 
subsidies. There is case to be made that a new well-resourced and independent competitor 
in the ratings industry could have a positive effect. However, a publicly-sponsored 
European agency is likely to have serious reputational problems. One must presume that 
this is the agency that M. Junker expects to provide higher ratings for European sovereigns. 
But that is exactly why private investors will be suspicious about the reliability of ratings 
from this source. Overall, the argument for a public agency to participate competitively in 
the issuer-pays market is weak.  
A more promising set of proposals relate to a more radical overhaul of the industry, 
replacing the issuer-pays model and the many incentive problems that go with it. There are 
many possible alternative models but the principal one that has been discussed involves a 
central (not necessarily public) body that assigns ratings agencies to issuers. The funding 
of such an approach could come from a mix of sources such as a tax on financial 
institutions or a charge applied to issuers (who no longer pick their raters). Deb and 
Murphy (2009) provide a well-developed concrete model for how such a system would 
work, with taxes charged on the financial industry used to provide a subsidy to raters, 
which is minimised by collecting fees obtained in auctions from ratings agencies 
bidding for work.  
The Commission is proposing to publish a report on credit rating agencies' remuneration 
models in December 2012. I would encourage them to consider a bold restructuring. Such 
a move could have a far more positive impact than the full package of proposals that have 
just been put forward. 
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